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3Abstract
Security engineering is one of the important concerns during system development. It should
be addressed throughout the whole system development process; however in many cases it is
often dealt only during system development and maintenance.
There are several security modeling languages (e.g, Misuse case, Secure Tropos) that help
dealing with security risk management at the requirements stage. In this thesis, we are
focusing on the modeling languages (e.g. Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML) that are
used to design the system. More specifically we investigate how these languages support
information systems security risks management (ISSRM).
The outcome of this work is an alignment table between the Mal activity diagrams and
SecureUML language constructs to the ISSRM domain model concepts. We ground our
analysis and validate the received results on the number of illustrative examples. We hope that
our results will help developers to understand how they can consider security risks at the
system design stage. In addition we open the way for the interoperability between different
modeling languages that are analysed using the same conceptual background, thus, potentially
leading to the transformation between these modeling approaches.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Nowadays, Information Systems (IS) have large impact on our social and economical life.
Facebook, Twitter and e-Commerce sites are common phenomena in our daily life.
Information system also has become an integral part of organizational structure and
commerce. Introduction of information system has made our life easy, convenient and more
relaxing. But like many other opportunities information system also has its drawbacks.
Hacking of websites and stealing credit card information are not rare in Internet world. To
undermine all kind of potential attacks, information system needs to be secured. The
significance of security technologies is now widely accepted and is therefore receiving a
continuous attention. As a result security facets play a vital role in any modern information
system.
But security mechanism is not free, it needs investment. So, Return On Security Investment
(ROSI) has become a major concern (Mayer, 2009) in many organizations. This involves a
risk management processes to justify investment for security measures and the business assets
to be protected. This creates new approach in organization called security risk management.
To support security risk management, security mechanism should be addressed and realized at
all the stages of the information system development.
1.1 Scope
This research work is about the design stage support for security risk management. In this
work, we will mainly focus on security risk management for information system. In the
following section we will introduce different related concepts and boundaries of this work.
1.1.1 Information System (IS)
The term information system is defined in different ways related to the domain it is used. For
our work we choose the definition of information system like this, “A system for
dissemination of data between persons - potentially, to increase their knowledge” (Turban et
al., 2010). It is clear from the definition that we will include both information technology (A
system for dissemination of data) and people’s (between persons) activities in this work as
information system. Our focus will be at the design stage of the information system.
1.1.2 Security Engineering
Security is usually seen in two different ways, dedicated malicious act and/or accidental harm
to the system or to the organization. Here we take the definition as “security is the degree to
which malicious harm is prevented, detected, and reacted .” (Firesmith, 2003). Security
covers broad range of areas including financial, environmental, information system. Here, we
will only work with the security concepts at design stage of the information system.
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1.1.3 Risk Management
Risk is a very general concept and applies to different domain. Risk can be seen as
combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequence. Risk management
(RM)  is defined as “coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard
to risk” (ISO, 2002). Risk management can be related to finance, organization, environment
and security etc. In this work we will only focus on the aspects of security risk management
for information system at the design stage.
So the overall scope of this work will be information system security risk management at the
design stage (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: The Scope of this Thesis Work
1.2 Motivation
Though security becomes a buzz word for information technology world but it is often seen as
ad-hoc basis during the later part of the  development cycle (Sindre, 2007). This approach (ad-
hoc) often leads to errors and vulnerabilities that provides a potential for exploitation.
Statistics from CERT/CC1, shows that the number of security incidents have increased quite
significantly from 2000-2007 (Figure. 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Number of Security Incident Reported to CERT/CC
1 http://www.cert.org/stats/
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A large  number of software vulnerabilities have indicated  that these systems are repeatedly
lacking the appropriate measures from design and implementation perspective. Any minor
flaw at the design stage can contribute significantly to the application vulnerabilities, which
can be exploited by the attackers. A study (Hoglund and McGraw, 2004) shows that design
stage problems were accounted for about 50% of the security flaws during the Microsoft's
"security push" in 2002. Viega and McGraw have mentioned design stage vulnerabilities as
the second major cause of security risk in software in their book (Viega and McGraw, 2002).
By following an improved and well structured process at design stage, with security in mind
can reduce these vulnerabilities quite significantly. Thus this work is motivated to help
developers to understand how they can consider security risks at the system design stage.
1.3  Mission Statement
In this section, the research problem and research questions are explained. Our research work
is concentrated on design stage support for analyzing security risk management. Thus, the
research problem of this work is,
Research problem: Support security modeling language for security risk management at the
design level.
This work targets to show how the design stage modeling language supports security risk
management. To do so, we will first explore security risk management methods and
frameworks to understand how security risks are managed. Then we will investigate different
modeling languages and particularly design stage modeling languages. We will look into their
concepts (e.g., syntax and semantics) and will align them with the security risk management
concept.
The work does not develop any design level modeling language, because of the limited
resources and time available. Instead, the work discusses about the concept alignment (we do
not mean the exact match but rather correspondence, similarity or overlap of concepts) of the
exiting design level modeling language to help developers to address security risk at design
stage. To understand and deal with the research problem, it is divided into three research
questions.
RQ 1: Is there any domain model which would help to understand security risk management
at design stage?
This question will investigate the available security methods (e.g., Braber et al., 2007,
Mead et al. 2005) and security risk management frameworks (e.g., Haley et al. 2006, Lee
et al. 2007). This will help us to understand the concepts of security risk management and
how they are managed. The outcome of this question will be a selection of security risk
management domain model which we will use to analyze the modeling language at the
design stage.
RQ 2: What are potential security modeling languages at the design stage to support
security risk management?
This question will look into different modeling languages, specially design stage modeling
languages. In this work, we will focus on UML based approaches which have security
extension (e.g., Misuse cases (Sindre and Opdahl, 2001), Abuse cases (McDermott and
14
Fox, 1999) etc). However, to understand how the modeling languages could be considered
with respect to security risk management, we will also look into two goal-oriented
languages, i.e., Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2005) and KAOS with security extension
(Lamsweerde, 2004). We will mainly work with the concepts of design stage modeling
language (e.g., Mal activity diagrams (Sindre, 2007) and SecureUML(Lodderstedt et al.,
2002)).
RQ 3: How could the security modeling language support security risk management at the
design stage?
The question involves the analysis of concepts of the design stage modeling languages
(Mal activity diagrams (Sindre, 2007) and SecureUML(Lodderstedt et al., 2002)) with
respect to security risk management. We will work to find the concept alignment between
design stage modeling language and security risk management for information system. The
outcome of this question will be concept alignment tables. This alignment table will help
software developer to better understand security risk at the design phase.
The working hypothesis of this study is that if the developers understand and can realize
security risk at the design stage, it will help them to develop secured system. Last but not the
least, it needs to be clearly mentioned that this understanding will help to better deal with
security vulnerabilities at design stage  but will not alone solve all the problem.
1.4  Thesis Outline
The thesis is organized in five parts and eight chapters.
Part I, Background Study contains three chapters. The second chapter is related to the
theoretical overview of the current practices and research related to security risk management
approaches. The third chapter discusses about existing concept alignment between
requirement engineering modeling languages and information system security risk
management (ISSRM) (Dubois, 2010) concepts. The fourth chapter investigates the security
extension of UML diagrams, specially for design.
Part II, Security Risk Management for IS Design contains two chapters. The fifth chapter
discusses about the concept alignment between Mal activity diagrams and ISSRM domain
model. The sixth chapter shows the concept alignment between SecureUML and ISSRM
domain model. Both of this alignment is done by using a running example described in Annex
A.1.
Part III Validation contains one chapter. This chapter discusses about a case study (Section
7.2) which investigates the validity of our proposal in Table 5.1 and Table 6.1.
Part IV, Conclusions and Future Work summarizes the major findings and discusses the
future work. It also draws the conclusion and highlights the claimed contribution.
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PART  I
Background Study
The purpose of this part is to survey the state-of-the-art of the security risk management
approaches, existing alignment between requirement engineering language and ISSRM
domain model and modeling languages at design stage. The part consists of three chapters.
The second chapter Security Risk Management of Information System reviews the security
methods and security risk management focusing on information system. Overview of the
security method and security risk management include three approaches each. The objective
of this chapter is to choose a security risk management domain model for information system
which we will use in later chapter. This model will be used to investigate how the design
stage modeling language supports the security risk management of information system. In the
process of selecting the domain model, we investigate three security method: Security Quality
Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) Methodology (Mead et al. 2005), Framework by
Haley (Haley et al., 2008) and Framework by Lee (Lee et al., 2005) and three security risk
management approaches: CORAS (A Platform for Risk Analysis of Security Critical
Systems) (Braber et al., 2007), Tropos Goal Risk Model (Asnar et al., 2007) and Information
System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) Domain Model (Dubois et al., 2010). After
discussing concepts of these security methods and security risk management methods, ISSRM
domain model is selected.
In the third chapter Security Risk Management for IS Requirement Engineering, we study
concept alignment of Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2005), KOAS with Security Extension
(Lamsweerde, 2004) and Misuse case (Sindre and Opdahl, 2001) with ISSRM domain model.
This chapter contributes with understanding of the research method that we apply to align the
design stage languages with ISSRM domain model. In first section of the chapter we analyze
the research method that has been used in these alignments. Later in the chapter, we present a
concept alignment table which contains the ISSRM domain model concepts and their
alignment with three requirement engineering modeling languages.
The fourth chapter Security Modeling Language for System Design surveys different
modeling languages. The purpose of this survey is to understand design stage modeling
language concepts. We investigate Abuse cases (McDermott and Fox, 1999), Misuse cases
(Sindre and Opdahl, 2001), Mal activity diagrams (Sindre, 2007), UMLSec (Jurjens, 2002)
and SecureUML (Lodderstedt et al., 2002). Among these languages Abuse cases and Misuse
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cases are used at the requirement engineering and Mal activity diagrams, UMLSec and
SecureUML are used at the design stage. We investigate the concrete syntax, meta model,
semantics and their processes by using an example presented in Annex A.1. The outcome of
this chapter is that we select two design stage modeling languages: Mal activity diagrams and
SecureUML.
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CHAPTER 2
Security  Risk Management of
Information System
Various security frameworks (e.g., Haley et al. 2006, Lee et al. 2007) and security risk
management methods (e.g., Braber et al., 2007, Mead et al. 2005) have been proposed to
investigate, analyze and risk treatment for security risk management. We will discuss some
methods and frameworks here to understand the key concepts regarding security risk
management for information system. We have selected SQUARE (Security Quality
Requirements Engineering) method (Mead et al., 2005), CORAS (A Platform for Risk
Analysis of Security Critical Systems) (Braber et al., 2007),  a framework  proposed by Haley
et al. (Haley et al. 2006), ISSRM domain model (Dubois et al., 2010) and a framework by
Lee et at. (Lee et al. 2007) to understand the security risk management concepts at design
stage. Based on this investigation we will answer our first research question: Is there any
domain model which would help to understand security risk management at design stage? At
the end of this chapter, we will summaries different features of these approaches to select a
domain model for the next chapters (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).
2.1  Security Methods
Today, information security is often conceptualized as being the protection or preservation of
three key aspects of information: availability, integrity and confidentiality.  Security methods
are used to secure the data and other components of the information  system by ensuring these
three major concepts. In addition to the technology, security method also enquires the
participation of everyone in the organization. In short, security methods are the procedures
and guidelines that define how security should be implemented.
2. 1.1 Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) Methodology
In requirement engineering, much attention is given on the functionality of the application and
most of the time the security features are neglected in the early phase of the development
process. When security features are added later in the system, they generally increase the cost
of the system. A study (Hoo et at., 2001) has showed that return on investment rises up to
12%-21% when security analysis and secure engineering practice are introduced in the early
development cycle. Requirement engineering also suffers from few common problems. For
example, all the relevant stakeholders are not taken into consideration and requirement
analysis process in use cannot elicit all the requirements of the system owner. Sometimes
requirements are not defined in a way that can be validated by the stakeholders or the system
owner later on. To overcome this problem, SQUARE methodology is proposed (Mead et al.
2005). SQUARE is a nine steps process, which elicits, categorizes and priorities security
requirements.
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How to Make Use of SQUARE :
Security requirements are specified before the critical architectural and design decision to get
the most benefit out of this methodology. In this way the critical business risk can be
addressed at the requirement engineering stage. The nine steps of the SQUARE method are
discussed below.
Step 1: Agree on Definitions. This is arranged as a focus group discussion where all the
stakeholders agree on a set of terminologies and their definitions to be used in this security
requirement activities.
Step 2: Identify Security Goals. In this step, the security requirements are aligned with the
business policies. The security requirements of all kind of stakeholders are documented and
addressed in this step. When goals of all the stakeholders are defined, they are then
prioritized.
Step 3: Develop Artifacts to Support Security Requirements Definition. In this step, the
necessary security artifacts are collected and created to support all the subsequent activities.
Misuse cases, Abuse cases and Attack tree etc. are used to support requirement definition.
Step 4: Perform Risk Assessment. In this step, the security expert, requirement engineers and
stakeholders participate in a discussion to select the appropriate risk assessment method for
the organization. The artifacts from Step 3 are used as the input for this step. The risks are
assessed by indentifying threat and vulnerabilities of the system and it can help to discover the
high priority security exposure.
Step 5: Select Elicitation Techniques. The elicitation technique is selected for the security
requirements based on the expertise of the stakeholders. A formal elicitation technique is
more effective when the participants are diverse and with different expertise level.  Elicitation
can be structured interviews, survey or even  by sitting down with the primary stakeholders.
Step 6: Elicit Security Requirements. This is the main process where the elicitation of the
security requirement is done using the selected elicitation technique selected in the previous
step. This is built by using the artifacts created in Step 3, such as misuse cases, abuse cases,
attack trees and threat scenarios.
Step 7: Categorize Requirements. Requirement engineers categorizes the elicited security
requirements based on the standard methods. This step also helps to priorities the activities in
the next step.
Step 8:  Prioritize Requirements. Prioritization of the elicited security requirements is done
not only by the security techniques but also on the basis of the cost/benefit analysis in order to
select the highest payoff security requirements.
Step 9 :  Requirements Inspection. Security requirement inspection is done to provide the
organization an initial set of prioritized security requirements. This also indicates the
incomplete part which should be revisited at a later time.
In short, SQUARE is a procedure for eliciting, categorizing and prioritizing security
requirements for information technology systems and applications. SQUARE indentifies
security requirements by discussing with the stakeholders of the system and security experts.
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This approach is focused on security requirements of information system. Though it is
focused on requirement engineering stage but it gives us the understanding of security risk
management for information system which we can use at design stage.
2.1.2 A Framework for Representation and Analysis of Security Requirements Engineering by
Haley et al.
This framework (Haley et al., 2008) is proposed by Haley et al. to define adequate security
requirements to fulfill the security goals. This is based on three major concepts:
1. Definition: A clear definition of security requirements and related concepts.
2. Context: A more comprehensive guideline about the boundary of the system. All the
assumptions and preconditions must be well defined for information system and its
environment.
3. Satisfaction: There must  be a  mechanism to prove that whether  any specific security
requirement satisfies the security goal or not. It also checks whether information
system satisfies the security requirements or not.
The security requirement framework described in this framework ensures the elicitation,
validation and verification of security requirements and other artifacts by combining two
major concepts, requirement engineering and security engineering (Firesmith, 2003).
Functional goals, which constitute the functional requirement are taken from requirement
engineering.  From security engineering, it takes the concept of asset, treats and harm.
The main steps of this framework are described as,
1. Security goals are set to protect the asset from any kind of harm.
2. The security goals are realized into the security requirements. The security
requirements set some constraints on the functional requirements to protect the asset
from harm.
3. Sometimes security requirement may lead to additional (secondary) security
requirements to countermeasure threat. Secondary security goals may call for
detective or preventative measures  of the system.
4. Security satisfaction arguments  are prepared to validate whether the system  respects
the security requirements or not. They include formal and informal proof methods.
The main focus of the framework is to determine security requirements in a more structured
way rather than proposing another risk management approach. Trust assumption (Haley et al.,
2006) and problem frames (Jackson, 2001) are used in this framework to define the security
requirements.
In this approach, we see the concepts of asset, threat and harm which help us to understand
the semantics of security risk management artifacts. The mapping of security goals and
security requirements of this approach helps to better understand the alignment concepts for
modeling languages at the design stage.
2.1.3  The Department of Defense Information Technology Security Certification and
Accreditation Process Automation Framework by Lee et al.
Certification and Accreditation (C&A) security requirements are expressed in multiple
regulatory documents with interdependencies but with different levels of abstraction. This
makes these security requirements hard to understand, predict, and control. To address these
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issues, Lee et al. (Lee et al., 2007) proposed a novel technique by combining software
requirement engineering and knowledge engineering2.
This framework is based on Requirements Domain Model (RDM) which is a hierarchical
representation of ontological concepts derived from DITSCAP (Department of Defense
Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process) oriented security
requirements and policies (Lee et al., 2006). It explains the relationships between security
requirements and risk components of the system. It identifies the risk components and map
them to concepts in domain specific taxonomies (e.g., threats, assets, vulnerabilities,
countermeasures). DITSCAP automation framework follows the steps discussed below to
identify security requirements.
1. Security requirements related information about the system and users are gathered by
using questionnaires.
2. The answers of the questionnaires are analyzed to expand the set of applicable security
requirements including personal controls, logical access controls, network controls and
cryptographic controls.
3. After the applicable set of security requirements are defined, their compliance
information are gathered. Security requirements and risk relationship model guide the
discovery of such compliance information.
4. The relationship between security requirements and the risk relationship model is used
to assess the level of compliance of security requirements of the RDM.
This approach (Figure 2.1) shows the relationship between security requirements and risk
management. Risk related information influences the security requirements. This relationship
between security requirement and risk management will help us to understand the risk related
concept at the design stage.
Figure 2.1: Security Requirements and Risk Relationship Model
2 http://www.epistemics.co.uk/Notes/61-0-0.htm
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2.2  Security Risk Management
Security risk management is a process to identify, assess and prioritize risk which is followed
by decisions about acceptable risk. The strategies consist of policy options that have varying
effects on risk, including avoidance, reduction, reallocation or retention of risk. In the end, an
acceptable level of risk is determined and a strategy for achieving that level of risk is adopted.
Cost-benefit calculations, assessments of risk tolerance and quantification of preferences are
often involved in this decision-making process (Hoo, 2000).
2.2.1 CORAS
CORAS (Braber et al., 2007) is a security risk modeling method for analysis of security threat
and risk scenarios. CORAS is mainly focused on the security critical system and it puts more
emphasis on information technology security. It uses a customized graphical language
(influenced by UML) (Figure 2.2) for communication and  documentation of the security risk
analysis. It also provides a detail guideline on how to use this language to capture security
requirements and model relevant information in different steps of the process. This method
also provides a computerized tool3 to support documenting, maintaining and reporting
analysis results through risk modeling.
The CORAS Language
CORAS modeling language supports security risk analysis and several other purposes in each
phase of the analysis. A typical security risk analysis is normally structured into five phases:
(1) context establishment, (2) risk identification, (3) risk estimation, (4) risk evaluation and
(5) treatment identification (Braber et al., 2007).  CORAS language consists of five kinds of
diagrams to support all these five phases of the risk analysis namely assets overview
diagrams, threat diagrams, risk overview diagrams, treatment diagrams and treatment
overview diagrams. Their basic building blocks are presented in Figure. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Basic Building Blocks of the CORAS Diagrams
(Adapted from Braber et al. 2007 )
CORAS has developed its own modeling framework with its own concepts. The main
concepts proposed by CORAS are,
Assets. Assets are any objects or features of the system which have value to the client.  It can
be any physical component of the system, services, software or hardware.
3 http://coras.sourceforge.net/downloads.html
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Stakeholders. Stakeholders are the people who are influenced by the system, such as the user
of the system, owner of the system and administrator of the system.  They are affected by any
activity or  risk on the system.
Vulnerability. Vulnerability is a weakness of the system or organization.
Threat. Threat may exploit a vulnerability and cause an unwanted incident.
Threat Scenario. It is a sequence of events or activities leading to an unwanted incident.
Unwanted Incident. It is an incident which causes harm to assets and reduces the value.
Risk. A risk is an unwanted incident along with its estimated likelihood and consequence
values.
Treatment. Treatments correspond to various choices for reducing risk.
How to Use CORAS
CORAS method consists seven steps to identify, estimate and indulge risk.
Step 1: Introduction. First meeting between analyst and the client. Analyst gets the idea
about the goal  of the analysis from the client’s presentation and discussion.
Step 2: High Level Analysis. Firstly, the analyst presents his understanding from the last
meeting’s presentation and documents  that are made available by the client. Secondly, a very
rough  security analysis is done. In this analysis the basic threat, vulnerabilities and risks are
identified.
Step 3: Approval. In this step, the analyst presents a more refined description of the target
that will be analyzed. Here all the assumption and precondition are made about the system to
be investigated.  Client approves all the documentation at the end of this step.
Step 4: Risk Identification. This step is arranged as a workshop where all the stakeholders
and experts are present. The aim of this meeting is to find unwanted scenario, threat and
vulnerabilities.
Step 5: Risk Estimation. This is also done as a workshop focusing on estimating
consequences of previously identified incidents.
Step 6: Risk Evaluation. The analyst presents the full risk analysis  to the client. Client gives
his feedback on the analysis and all these feedbacks are incorporated in the analysis.
Step 7: Risk Treatment. In this step the appropriate risk treatment is identified. The
cost/benefit issues of the treatments are also discussed in the workshop.
CORAS has its own language and method to deal with security risk. It involves the
stakeholders and security experts. There is a continuous communication and feedback
mechanism in this method. This approach is also focused on security risk management of
information system. The security risk related terminologies and concepts introduced in this
method will help us to better understand security risk related concepts at design stage.
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2.2.2 Tropos Goal-Risk Model
Tropos Goal-Risk model (Asnar et al., 2007)  is built on the core concept of risk and is open
to any risk domain such as financial or project management and not limited to information
system security. The main objective of this framework is to assess the risk of uncertain events
over organization strategies and to evaluate the effectiveness of treatments (Asnar et al.,
2008) .
The Tropos Goal-Risk model (GR-Model) is represented by requirements model graph
<N,R>, where N stands for  nodes and R stands for relations. Any node, N is composed of
three constructs, goal, task and event. Goals are strategic interests that actors intend
to achieve. Events  are uncertain circumstance out of the control of actors that can have an
impact on the achievement of goals. Tasks are sequences of actions used to achieve goals or
to treat the effects of events.
Key concept of GR-model is to assess risk on the basis of trust (dependency) relation among
different actors. To access the risk of the organization GR-Model uses two concepts:
delegation and trust. Delegation is used to share the responsibility with other actors.  But the
delegation sometimes can be vulnerable because if the delegate fails to achieve his goal the
whole objective will fail. So, delectation adds risk in the system. Trust is used to present the
expected behavior from any actor (trustee) by another actor (trustor) in achieving a goal.
The GR-Model consists of three conceptual layers as shown in Figure 2.3 by using our
running example (Annex A.1).
 Goal layer analyzes the goals of each actor and identifies which tasks the actor needs
to perform to achieve these goals;
 Event layer models uncertain events along their effects to the goal layer;
 Treatment layer identifies and analyses treatments to be adopted in order to mitigate
risks.
The final outcome of this model is to find out the level of satisfaction or denial of the goal that
is set in the Goal layer.
In short, Goal-Risk model supports modeling by assessing and treating risks on the basis of
the likelihood and severity of failures. Risk related concepts discussed in this model will help
us to understand the security risk management concepts at the design stage.
2.2.3  Information System Security Risk (ISSRM)  Domain Model
ISSRM domain model (Dubois, 2010) is influenced and derived from different security
related standards (e.g, ISO/IEC, 2002) and methods (e.g., Braber et al., 2007). To provide a
holistic view it accumulates concepts from four main sources, (1) Security Risk Management
(RM) Standards, (2) Security related Standard, (3) Security RM Methods, and (4) Security
oriented Framework.
ISSRM Domain Model
ISSRM domain model supports definition of security for the key information system
constituents and addresses the information system security risk management process at three
different conceptual level, i.e., (i) asset-related concepts ; (ii) risk-related concepts; and (iii)
risk treatment-related concepts.
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Asset-related concepts explain what important assets have to be protected. Assets are
anything that have values to the organization and the owner or stakeholder wants to protect.
The notions that describe the  asset-related concepts are business assets, IS assets and security
criterion. Business assets are plans, processes, information which have value for the
organization. IS assets are information system components which support business assets.
Security criterion defines the security needs of the business assets. It is mainly defined as
confidentiality, availability and integrity.
Figure 2.3: Tropos Goal-Risk Model
Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself and its components are defined. Risk is
defined as the combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities which leads to a
negative impact harming one or more assets. Impact shows the negative consequence of a
risk on asset if threat is accomplished. Vulnerability is expressed as the weakness or any
flaws of the IS  asset or group of IS assets. An event is composed of a threat and one or more
vulnerabilities. A threat is described as a potential attack, which may harm one or more asset
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by targeting IS assets.  An attack method characterizes a standard means by which a threat
agent executes threat.
Risk treatment-related concepts discuss about the decision, security requirement and
control to alleviate possible risks. Risk treatment is the decision (e.g., avoidance, reduction,
retention or transfer) to handle the identified risk. Security requirement is the improvement
and fine tuning of the risk treatment decision to mitigate the risk. A control provides the
means to improve security, defined by implementing the security requirement.
Figure 2.4: The ISSRM Domain Model (Adapted from Mayer, 2009)
ISSRM Process:
ISSRM process is a model based approach which is driven by risk analysis. This is a security
requirement engineering process which consists of  the following six steps.
Step 1 : Context and Asset Identification. The process begins by defining the organization’s
context and the identification of its assets, both business assets and IS assets. Description of
the organization and its environment are given, focusing on the sensitive activities related to
information security.
Step 2:  Determination of Security Objectives. In this step, organization defines its security
requirements. Security objectives are determined based on the asset identification in the
previous step. Security objectives are often defined in terms of confidentiality, integrity and
availability properties of the assets.
Step 3: Risk Analysis and Assessment. In this step, risk identification and estimation are
performed. The estimation can be either qualitative or quantitative. The process will go to the
next step if  analyzed risks have been evaluated against the security needs, which are
determined during the second step of the process. Otherwise, the process will go back to Step
1 and has to review the  context and asset identification phase.
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Step 4:  Risk Treatment. Risk treatment can be performed in four different ways, risk
avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer or risk retention. In risk avoidance mechanism, no
decision is taken to get involved in any risk situation. Risk reduction consists of taking actions
to lessen the probability of negative consequences associated with a risk. In risk transfer
decision, risk is shared with another party. Sometimes it requires some additional security
requirements for the third  parties. In risk retention decision, the burden of loss from the risk
is accepted. So, no security measure is necessary in that case.
Figure 2.5:  ISSRM Process (Adapted from Mayer, 2009)
Step 5: Security Requirements Definition. This step depends on the risk treatment
procedure that we have chosen in Step 4. Risk reduction decisions lead to security
requirements on the information system to mitigate the risk on the system. Special design
decision has to be taken to reduce the risk on the system. Even for risk transfer decision, some
special requirement must have to fulfill by the third party. At the end of the security
requirements definition step, if they are considered as unsatisfactory, the risk treatment step
should be revised, or all of the preceding steps can be revised from the definition of the
context and the assets.
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Step 6: Control Selection and Implementation. It is a designed means to improve security
of the system by taking appropriate security policies, countermeasures and implementation. It
is achieved by setting  proper security requirements and ensuring the implementation to
comply with it.
This process is a repetitive process and the process should be run until the proper security
measures are ensured. Lastly, security risks are continuous process and so should be the
counter measures.
ISSRM domain model provides its own terminologies and relationship between them. It also
defines six step process. It gives detail definition of its terminologies which help us to
understand security risk management related concepts. Investigation of this domain model
will help us to investigate the security risk management concepts of information system at the
design stage.
2.3  Summary
Different security risk management methods (e.g., Braber et al., 2007, Mead et al. 2005) and
frameworks (e.g., Haley et al. 2006, Lee et al. 2007) are discussed in this chapter. From this
illustration we have got ideas and understanding about concepts and process of different
security and security risk management related approaches. From the aforementioned
discussions we have come up with different terminologies (e.g., asset, risk, threat and
vulnerabilities) that are used in security risk management domain. In table 2.1, we illustrate
these approaches in 5 columns. Definition of terminologies shows whether the method or
framework is using standard terminologies or using its own terminologies. Information system
based approach column illustrates whether the approach is focused on information system or
not. Risk based approach shows whether the approach addresses the risk concept or not.
Supported tools column shows whether the approach has any tools to support the process.
Used for alignment with modeling language indicates whether the approach is applied for
alignment with any modeling language or not.
From the above discussions and investigation, we have chosen ISSRM domain model to
investigate the modeling languages at the design stage. The reasons behind our decision are as
follow,
 It has already been used for concept alignment at requirement engineering
(Matulevičius et al., 2008)
 It defines the security risk management concepts at three different conceptual levels,
which will help us to find and align specific security risk management concepts in any
information system.
 It is focused on information system development.
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Table 2.1 : A Relative Study of Different Methods and Frameworks
Name of the
Method /
Framework
Definition of
terminologies
Information
system
based
approach
Risk based
approach
Supported
tools
Used for
alignment
with
modeling
language
SQUARE Definition is set
by RE team,
experts and
stakeholders
Yes No No No
Framework by
Haley et al.
Standard
definition of
terminology is
used
Yes No No No
Framework by
Lee et al.
Standard
definition of
terminology is
used
Yes Have risk
related
concepts
but does not
have well
defined
process
Yes No
CORAS Uses its own
symbols and
terminology
Yes Yes Yes No
Tropos Goal-
Risk
Framework
Standard
definition of
terminology is
used
It is more
general
approach.
Yes No No
ISSRM
domain model
Standard
definition of
terminology is
used
Yes Yes No Yes
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CHAPTER 3
Security Risk Management for IS
Requirement Engineering
ISSRM domain model has already been used to analyze the security risk management support
at the requirement engineering. In this chapter, we will discuss about these (Secure Tropos
(Mouratidis, 2005), KOAS(Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) with security
extension (Lamsweerde, 2004) and Misuse cases (Sindre and Opdahl, 2001)) alignments. We
will study these alignment works (e.g., Matulevičius et al., 2008) to understand how they are
done (e.g, research method). By understanding these alignment works we can reuse the
existing method to analyze security modeling languages at the design stage. This will
contribute to answer our first research question: Is there any domain model which would help
to understand security risk management at design stage?
3.1 Aligning Security Modeling Languages with ISSRM Domain Model
The main objective of the alignment of modeling languages with ISSRM domain model
concepts is to verify how these languages support security risk management. Another
objective is to help the developers to realize security risk through the modeling language
constructs.
For all these three alignments (e.g., alignment of Secure Tropos, KeS and Misuse case), same
research method has been used. We will also apply the same research method for the
languages at the design stage. The research method consists of three steps (Figure 4.1),
1. Investigate the abstract syntax, semantics and concrete syntax to understand the
language.
2. Apply the modeling language according to the ISSRM process (described in Section
2.2.3) by using an example.
3. Analyze the observations (How modeling language construct can be used by following
ISSRM process)
These three steps are followed for any particular modeling language by using an example. We
will use Meeting scheduler (Feather, 1997), a well-established exemplar in requirement
engineering, for this presentation. In Section 4.5, we will summarize these three cases and
will provide an alignment table (Table 3.1).
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Figure 3.1:  Research Method Used for this Work.
3.2 Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2005) is based on the core concept of Tropos (Bresciani et al.,
2004). It is an agent oriented modeling language which is used from the early requirement
phase to the architectural and detailed design stage. In this work we will only focus on the
early and late requirement stages. Secure Tropos consists of Tropos constructs (actor,
goal, softgoal and resource) and security constructs (security constraint
and threat). These constructs are connected by relationships: dependency (including sub
type of secure dependency) and dependum (e.g., goal, softgoal, resource or
plan). Semantics of these constructs and relationship can be found in (Mouratidis, 2005).
Mayer has shown how to use Secure Tropos to analyze the security risk and how it aligns with
ISSRM domain model in (Mayer, 2009). We will use this illustration in our example (meeting
scheduler) to find out the security risk and countermeasures.
We will follow the ISSRM process (described in Section 2.2.3) but will use Secure Tropos
constructs to analyze our example (meeting scheduler) here.
1.) Context and Asset Identification. Figure 3.2 shows the content of the meeting scheduler
by using Secure Tropos. Here someone ( represented as Secure Tropos construct actor) will
initiate a meeting and the participants (actor) will be informed and agreed for the meeting
by the Scheduler system. The goal of the system is to find out an agreement (Meeting to
be scheduled) for the meeting. This goal will be achieved by a plan (obtain agreement)
and finally agreement will be established.
2.) Security Objective Determinations. Determination of vulnerable assets and security
criteria is supported by softgoal. Here, agreement (business asset) is confidential and
needs to be secured. Thus, we will concentrate on the confidentiality of the agreement.
3.) Risk Analysis and Assessment. Figure 3.3 shows a possible risk event. Here, Attacker
wants to disclose the agreement. This goal of the attacker is to exploit the vulnerability
(Authenticate participant) of the system. This vulnerability threats softgoal (Only used by
participants of the meeting).
ISSRM Domain Model
Security Modeling
Languages  (Design stage)
Alignment of
security
language with
ISSRM
Application of
security language
according to ISSRM
to solve the problem
through an example
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Figure 3.2: Asset Modeling in Secure Tropos
4.) Risk Treatment. Risk treatment is used to take the decision to mitigate the risk. Here we
will take a risk reduction- i.e., action to lessen the probability of the negative consequences.
5.) Security Requirements Definition. Based on the risk treatment decision, security
requirements are defined by security goals/plan/resources. Here, to maintain the
confidentiality of the agreement, a plan is defined (Perform cryptographic procedures)
(Figure 3.4). Even if the attacker gets the agreement information he cannot read the agreement
because it is encrypted. Thus, this plan ensures the security requirement (confidentiality) for
the agreement.
6.) Control Selection and Implementation. Secure Tropos does not suggest any techniques
to select and implement controls.
Alignment of ISSRM and Secure Tropos. The detail alignment between these two
approaches is presented in (Mayer, 2009). They are aligned in the following way and also
presented in Table 3.1.
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ISSRM asset-related concepts: business assets and IS assets are represented by actor,
goal, resource and plan constructs of Secure Tropos. Security criterion is
expressed by security constraint and softgoal constructs of Secure Tropos.
About risk related concepts, risk cannot be represented by any constructs of Secure Tropos,
but Secure Tropos can represent event (as a threat construct) and impact (as directed
contribution between threat and softgoal) by its constructs. ISSRM threat agent is
defined by Secure Tropos actor and attack method is defined by plan (with attack
relationship). ISSRM threat is represented by Secure Tropos goals/plans. Vulnerability
does not match with any constructs but it is possible to show the IS assets that have
vulnerability points. ISSRM risk treatment related concepts are represented by
Secure Tropos actors, goals, resources, plans and security
constraints.
Figure 3.3: Threat Definition Using Secure Tropos
Obtain
agreement
Authenticate
participant
Reveal
stolen data
Steal
agreement
Try authentication
repeatedly
Only used by
participants of
the meeting
Attacker
Scheduler Agreement
to be obtained
Agreement
Disclose
agreement
attack
exploit
Legend
Goal
Plan
ResourceVulnerabilitypoint
Actor and system
boundary
33
Figure 3.4: Risk Treatment Using Secure Tropos
3.3 KAOS extension to Security (KeS)
The KAOS (Knowledge Acquisition in automated Specification) approach consists of a
modeling language, a method and a software environment. The main purpose of KAOS is to
ensure that high-level goals are identified and progressively refined into precise operational
statements. Along this process, various alternative goals and responsibility assignments are
considered until the most satisfactory solution is chosen. KAOS extended to Security (KeS)
has been introduced in (Lamsweerde, 2004). The main objective of KeS is defined by goal.
The goal can be decomposed into several sub goals. These sub goals are again refined till
the requirement is defined. The detail procedure to meet the goal is defined by an operational
model.  Risks to the system are represented by anti goal model.  And the countermeasure of
the anti goal model is defined by a new security requirement. The action of the model is
defined by using two constructs achieve and avoid. Achieve means the system must
have to achieve this goal and avoid means system must have to resist it from this goal.
1.) Context and Asset Identification. Figure 3.5 shows the content of the meeting scheduler
by using KeS. The main goal studied here is Achieve [arrange meeting] which is
characterize by domain property (Only in business hours). The goal is also refined as
subgoal(Accept the invitation, Meeting invitation and Avoid [InvitationReceived
ByCrook]). The detail procedure of the information system is given as operational model in
Figure 3.5. The goal (Meeting invitation) is performed by Initiator. He also performs
other operations (Select the time, Send invitation and Select participants). The objects are
used to support goals, here object is Database of participants.
2.) Security Objective Determinations. The determination of security objectives is done in
the same model (Figure 3.5) and generally in the same time as the elicitation of other goals.
Security criteria are defined by using Avoid. Here, we have seen Avoid
Schedular
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participants of
the meeting
Perform
cryptographic
procedures
Obtain
agreement
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Schedular
Agreement
Disclose
agreement
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[InvitationReceived ByCrook] as security objective which ensures the integrity of the system.
This security objective can be achieved by two alternative goals Avoid [AccessToSystem
ByCrook] and Avoid [LoginInformationKnown ByCrook].
3. ) Risk Analysis and Assessment. Figure 3.6 shows a possible risk event. Here, Attacker
wants to know the login information of the legitimate user of the system. Risk analysis is done
by creating an anti goal model. Like goal, anti-goal is also defined and decomposed as sub
goal (e.g., Achieve     [UsernameKnownByCrook], Achieve [PasswordKnownByCrook] ) until
reaching anti requirement (e.g., Achieve [UseSocialEngineeringtoLearnPassword]) assigned
to anti-agent (Attacker) in Figure 3.6.  Vulnerabilities are also identified in anti-model, like
EmployeesNotSecurityAware. The operation model is also defined to meet the security
requirements.
4.) Risk Treatment. In KeS, risk treatment is defined through the countermeasure chosen for
handling the anti-model and its associated vulnerabilities and anti goals. In our example, risk
(here vulnerability) avoidance is chosen as countermeasure.
5.) Security Requirements Definition. New security goals are emerged from this
countermeasure. A new goal model is thus built, with additional security goal(s),
requirement(s) and/or expectation(s). A new requirement called PerformAwarenessTraining is
added to the goal model presented in Figure 3.7. This requirement is assigned to the Security
officer (agent).
6.) Control Selection and Implementation. KeS does not suggest any techniques to select
and implement controls.
Alignment of ISSRM and KeS. The detail of the concept alignment between KeS and
ISSRM domain model can be found in (Mayer, 2009). ISSRM asset related concepts are
represented by KAOS goal, requirement and expectation (both business asset
and IS asset). In fact, KeS does not differentiate business asset and IS asset. Operation and
object are also used to present asset. Security criteria are expressed by goal and
object attributes. Threat agent is presented by anti-agent and action method by
operationalisation, domain and required conditions and operation. Vulnerability is defined by
the domain property.  At higher level of abstraction anti goal represents event and
at lower level (realization) of abstraction it (in combination with anti-requirements and anti-
expectation ) represents threat. Security requirement is represented by security goal.
This goal can be further refined by security requirement and expectation.
3.4 Misuse Cases
Concept alignment between Misuse cases/Misuse case diagram (will discuss in Section 4.3)
and ISSRM domain model is presented in (Matulevičius et al, 2008). The assessment is done
by analyzing the Misuse cases meta-model and textual explanations.
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Figure 3.5: Asset Modeling Using KeS
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Figure 3.6: Threat Definition Using KeS
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Figure 3.7: Risk Treatment Using KeS
1.) Context and Asset Identification. In Figure 3.8, we have modeled the meeting scheduler
example. Here, the element of the meeting scheduler is represented by use case in the
diagrams. For example, obtain available dates in the Misuse case diagrams is the asset for the
meeting scheduler.
2.) Security Objective Determinations: Determination of vulnerable assets and security
criteria is not supported by use cases. Use cases can only be used to reason about security
criteria without showing them in a diagram. In our example, we concentrate on three security
objectives: (i) availability of agreement; (ii) confidentiality of agreement, and (iii) integrity of
agreement.
3.) Risk Analysis and Assessment. Misuse case diagrams involves a misuser (attacker)
(Figure 3.9). The Attacker targets the availability with the misuse case(Make agreement
unavailable). It threatens the use case (Store agreement). The Attacker targets the
confidentiality and integrity by other misuse cases (Change the date of agreement and
Disclose agreement). Disclose agreement includes two other misuse cases (Steal
date and Reveal stolen date).
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4.) Risk Treatment. The Misuse case diagrams do not suggest any risk treatment.
Security use cases can be selected as the risk reduction decision out of four possible
risk treatment processes based on general security risk management process.
5.) Security Requirements Definition. Misuse case diagrams has mitigates syntax which
provides security requirements for the system. In the running example, Check participant
identity is a security use case which mitigates the risk (Disclose agreement) (Figure 3.10).
6.) Control Selection and Implementation. Misuse case does not suggest any technique to
select and implement controls.
Alignment of ISSRM and Misuse Cases. ISSRM asset related concepts  are expressed by
standard use case construct. Business asset and IS asset are represented by actor, use
case and system construct of Misuse case diagrams. Risk related concepts: threat agent
is presented by misuser and misuse case represent attack method. So, threat is defined
by the combination of misuser and misuse case. Risk treatment related concepts are
supported by security use case in the use case diagrams.
Figure 3.8: Asset Modeling Using Misuse Case Diagrams
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Figure 3.9: Threat Definition Using Misuse Case Diagrams
Figure 3.10: Security Requirements Using Misuse Case Diagrams
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3.5  Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed about the research method that is used for the alignment of
the requirement engineering language and ISSRM domain model. The discussion in this
chapter proves that this method can identify requirement engineering constructs which can be
mapped with ISSRM domain model concepts. So, we will follow the same method for the
alignment at the design stage.
Table 3.1 shows the summery of the concept alignment. Here, we present how each ISSRM
domain model concept is represented by these three modeling language constructs. Empty
place in the alignment table shows that there is no appropriate construct of the modeling
language which can represent that ISSRM concept. In our alignment work in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6, we will also follow this table structure to show our results.
Table 3.1: Concept Alignment of Security Languages with ISSRM Domain Model
ISSRM Concepts Secure Tropos
Constructs
KeS Constructs Misuse Cases
Constructs
As
set
 re
late
d
con
cep
ts Asset Actor, Goal,Softgoal,
Plan, Ressource
Goal,
Requirement,
Expectation,
Operation,
object
Actor and Use
caseBusiness
asset
IS asset
Security criterion Security constraint,
Softgoal
Goal, Object
attributes
Ris
k r
ela
ted
con
cep
ts RiskImpact Contribution
between
threat and softgoal
Event Threat Goal,
Requirement,
Expectation (in
anti-model)
Threat Goal, Plan Misuser and
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case
Vulnerability Domain property
Threat agent Actor Agent Misuser
Attack
method
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attack
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+ Operations
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Ris
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ts Risk treatmentSecurity requirement Actor, Goal,
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CHAPTER 4
Security Modeling Language for
System Design
Modeling languages (e.g., UML (Object Management Group (OMG), 2004), Tropos
(Bresciani, 2004)) help to design, analyze and validate enterprise and application level
architectural models. To integrate security features throughout the software development
cycle, modeling languages have introduced security extension (e.g., Secure Tropos
(Mouratidis, 2005), SecureUML (Lodderstedt et al., 2002), UMLSec (Jurjens, 2002) etc). We
will investigate concepts and ideas of these extensions and will try to answer our second
research question: What are potential security modeling languages at the design stage to
support security risk management?
UML has become the de facto industry standard for specifying software intensive system
development. In this chapter, we will only look into security extension of UML based
diagrams. We will investigate syntax, semantics and the process of the security extension of
these modeling languages by using a running example (Appendix A.1).
4.1.  Unified Modeling Language (UML)
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a visual modeling language which is used for
specifying, documenting and constructing the artifacts of an object-oriented software
intensive system. UML provides a visual means to present requirements, design and
deployment of software system.
UML offers three major advantages: visualization, complexity management and
communication. UML is used to support software development methodology(e.g., Waterfall
methodology4, Agile methodology5) in different ways (e.g., by using Usec ase, Activity
diagrams) but it does not provide any development methodology. UML uses the following
notations and semantics to describe software development process:
 Use Case Model - describes the user interaction with the system. It also defines
the system boundary. It is mainly used in requirement phase.
 Class Model - usually used in design phase and describes the classes and objects
which build the system.
 Communication Model - describes how objects in the system will interact with
each other to get work done.
4 http://www.buzzle.com/editorials/1-5-2005-63768.asp
5 http://www-01.ibm.com/software/rational/agile/
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 Activity Diagrams – This model is used to present dynamic behavior of the
system. It describes the workflow of the system.
 The Physical Component Model - illustrates the hardware and software
components that make up the system.
UML diagrams are mainly divided into  two different views of a system model:
 Static (or structural) view: emphasizes the static structure of the system using
objects, attributes, operations and relationships. The structural view includes class
diagrams and composite structure diagrams.
 Dynamic (or behavioral) view: emphasizes the dynamic behavior of the system by
showing collaborations among objects and changes to the internal states of objects.
This view includes sequence diagrams, activity diagrams and state machine diagrams.
We will look into different security extensions of UML here. Abuse cases and Misuse cases
are security extension of Use case and used at requirement engineering. Mal activity diagrams
are proposed by extending Activity diagram and used in late requirement and at the design
stage. Both UMLSec and SecureUML are used at the design stage and are presented by using
UML profile.
4.2 Abuse Case Diagrams
McDermott has proposed Abuse case diagrams/Abuse cases (McDermott and Fox, 1999) to
bridge the gap between security domain and software requirement engineering. Abuse case
diagrams are defined as interactions between one or more actors which result into harmful
impact on the system or to other actors of the system. Another aspect of Abuse case diagrams
is that it should describe the privilege that is used to complete the abuse case.  Any abuse can
be happened by demolishing the total control of the system or by just taking control of some
part of it. Abuse case can also be accomplished by compromising any legitimate actor’s
credentials.  Because of the range of privileges, the Abuse case diagrams should be described
from minimum privilege violation to maximum level of violation.
Main Concepts of Abuse Cases
 Abuse case diagrams are a family of  transactions between one or more actors and a
system, that results in harm.
 UML-based use case diagrams.
 Potentially one family member for each kind of privilege abuse and for each
component that might be exploited.
 Includes a textual description of the range of security privileges that may be abused.
 Includes a description of the harm that results from an abuse case.
Example: We will apply Abuse case diagrams process (McDermott and Fox, 1999) on online
banking system example (described in Appendix A.1). In Figure 4.1, we see that actors
(Hacker and Malicious client) are interacting with the online banking system. The interactions
are steal login information, steal personal information and change banking policy (abuse
case). These interactions are presented as abuse case in Abuse case diagrams and result
into harm to the system (Online Bank).
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Figure 4.1: Abuse Case Diagrams
Textual description is used to give details about Abuse case diagrams. The textual description
is composed of two components: actor description and abuse case description. Three main
characteristics are defined related to actors: resources (e.g., software, hardware, other
tools), skill (e.g., technical skills related to information security) and objectives (e.g.,
financial benefit, vandalism, terrorism etc).  An example of textual description of abuse
case (steal login information) is proposed for Hacker in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Textual Descriptions of Abuse Case Diagrams
Actor Description Abuse Cases Description
Hacker
Resources:  The hacker has software,
hardware and necessary tools, and
internet connection and enough
financial support and time to break the
security of the system.
Skill: The hacker has enough technical
skill about information security,
network protocols and cryptography.
Objective: The hacker’s interest is to
gain financial benefit by transferring
money to his own account or to another
person’s account who has assigned him.
Steal login information
Harm: The hacker can transfer  money to
his own account by stealing login
information.
Privilege range:  By using the clients
privilege, the hacker can see the
transaction, transfer money, change the
login information, and pay bills etc.
Abuse interaction: by stealing the login
information the hacker can steal many
confidential information about the user. If
the client use the same password for other
services then those application/system will
be at risk.
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4.3 Misuse Case Diagrams
Misuse case diagrams/ Misuse cases(Sindre and Opdahl, 2001) are proposed by extending
traditional Use case diagrams by introducing negative use cases. In another way, it can be
seen as use case from a hostile actor’s perspective. It is also represented by two ways: textual
specification and graphical diagrams (Figure 4.3). Use case diagrams only gives an overview
of the system functionality, a relatively detailed description of the scenario is provided by an
associated textual description. This textual description is based on a template (presented in
Sindre and Opdahl, 2001) to be filled out by an analyst. The  template is extended to make it
suitable for describing Misuse cases by supporting detailed elicitation and analysis of security
threats. Misuse cases reuse the concepts existing in Use case diagrams namely actor, use
case and the associated relationships: threaten, include and mitigate
relationship.
Like Abuse case, Misuse case is also used at the requirement engineering. To see how the
Misuse case concepts support the ISSRM domain model concepts, a concept alignment is
presented in section 3.3. Main difference between an Abuse case diagrams and Misuse case
diagrams is that Misuse case diagrams keeps the normal use case  in the diagrams.
Example: Figure 4.3 presents a Misuse case diagrams based on online banking system
(Annex A.1). Misuse case diagrams comes with a security requirement process, which
outcomes into the elicitation of suited security requirements. The process consists of five
steps (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005). We will use this process in the example to see how Misuse
cases work.
1.) Identify Critical Assets. Login to the system, Do the transaction and Set banking rules
are the use case of the Misuse case diagrams in Figure 4.3. These use case can also be
seen as the critical assets of this system.
2.) Define Security Goal. Security goal is to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the
login information, transaction information and banking rules that needs to be protected from
malicious actor (e.g., Hacker).
3.) Identify Threats. Steal login information which is a misuse case, is treated as the
threat to the online banking system.  It is shown by relationship associating threaten to
use case(Login to the system).
4.) Identify and Analyze Risks. Steal login information is achieved by using another
misuse case(Use fake website). This is represented by using a relationship association
include.
5.) Define Security Requirements Graphical Misuse. Security requirement is set to achieve
the security goal. To do this a new actor (Security Official) is introduced. He will
Establish security training plan which includes a use case (security use
case )Create awareness among users. This will mitigate the security risk of the
online banking system.
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Figure 4.3: Misuse Case Diagrams
4.4 Mal Activity Diagrams
Mal activity diagrams (Sindre, 2007) is derived by extending the concepts of Activity
diagram.  It deals with the behavioral aspects of the security problems. Basic way to build a
Mal activity diagrams is to build a normal process first then add the mal activity (unwanted
behavior) against this process. This concept is similar to the Misuse case diagram in the way
that it also allows to put the defensive process (e.g., mitigation activity) to the diagrams. It
adds some extra concepts other than the ordinary activity diagrams, such as Mal-
Activity, Mal-swimlane and Mal-decision. These concepts are just opposite of
the normal activity diagrams constructs. It also defines MitigationActivity and
MitigationLink to show the mitigation process.
Unlike Misuse cases and Abuse cases, Mal activity diagrams do not have any defined process
about how to use Mal activity diagrams. Sindre has used these concepts on 46 cases presented
in (Mitnick, 2002). The concept alignment between Mal activity diagrams and ISSRM
domain model is presented in Chapter 5.
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Example: Figure 4.4 shows how Mal activity diagrams can model online banking system
example(Annex A.1). It shows the attack process by a Hacker (Mal-Swimlane) to the
online banking system with the help of a Fake website. The first Mal-Activity of the
attacker is to Send email with a fake website link. The fake website is a look alike of the target
website and maintained by the hacker. The client will Receive the malicious mail and based
on his decision to open or to delete the e-mail, the fake website will be opened in his browser
or the process will stop there. If the client puts the login information in the fake website, the
hacker will Collect the login information. Depending on the nature of the password (e.g., one
time password), the Mal-decision indicates the ability of the Hacker to collect useful
login information. A way of representing mitigation option is also proposed in the Mal
activity diagrams. On the right hand side of Figure 4.4, the mitigations
(MitigationActivity) are shown in a separate column and inserted into the attack
process with dashed arrows (MitigationLink). The Security module is there to mitigate
the security risk. The proposed mitigation activities are Enable mail filtering before Receive
the malicious e-mail and Enable anti-malware before Collecting the login information.
Mal Activity Diagrams Meta Model
We propose a meta model for Mal activity diagrams in Figure 4.5 (based on the available
literature (Sindre, 2007) on Mal activity diagrams). Mal activity diagrams start with an
InitialState (starting point) and finishes with a FinalState (end point). Mal
activity diagrams consist of three kinds of activities: Activity, Mal-Activity and
MitigationActivity. AnySwimlane holds all the constructs of the Mal activity
diagrams. AnySwimlane includes Swimlane and Mal-swimlane.  Swimlane
contains SwimlaneElement, which is composed of Activity,
MitigationActivity and Decision. An activity is the specification of a
parameterized sequence of behavior. A MitigationActivity shows the improvement
of the process to avoid MalciousActivity. Decision illustrates branching based on
order rejected or order accepted conditions.
Mal-swimlane includes Mal-swimlaneElement, which consists of Mal-
activity and Mal-decision. Mal-activity is the inverse of normal activity.
These activities are done by malicious actor to harm the normal business process. Mal-
decision is a decision which is made with a malicious purpose.
About the cardinality: One AnySwimlane can include many AnyState. One Swimlane
can include many SwimlaneElement and one Mal-swimlane can include many Mal-
swimlaneElement. The elements are complete and disjoint.
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Figure 4.4: Mal Activity Diagrams
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Figure 4.5: Meta Model of Mal Activity Diagrams
Figure 4.6 shows the control flow of the Mal activity diagrams. The process stars with
InitialState then it goes to AnyActivity which consists of Activity, Mal-
activity and MitigationActivity. Different Activity, Mal-activity and
MitigationAction are connected by ControlFlow. MitigationLink suggests
where in the process the MitigationActivity would be added. AnyDecision is also
used in the flow with the Activity and Mal-Activity when there is a need for any
choice between two alternatives.
Figure 4.6:  Control Flow of Mal Activity Diagrams
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4.5  UMLSec
UMLSec (Jurjens, 2002) is a UML profile based extension of the UML diagrams for
integrating security information. The profiles are  defined by a set of stereotypes,
base class, tag and constraints. Stereotypes define new types of modeling
elements by extending the semantics of existing types or classes in the UML meta model.
Their notation consists of the name of the stereotype written in double angle brackets << >>
and attached to the extended model element. This model element is then interpreted according
to the meaning described to the stereotype. One way of explicitly defining a property of the
model element is by attaching a tagged value to it. Another way of adding information to
a model element is by attaching constraints to refine its semantics. UMLSec defines 21
stereotypes together with their tags and constraints to support security requirements (Jürjens,
2004). Main strength of UMLSec is that it is very precisely defined and has formal semantics.
It evaluates UML specification for vulnerabilities and encapsulate security engineering
pattern.
Like Mal activity diagrams, UMLSec is also used at the design stage of the information
system development process. We will see how its concepts help to design a secure system
with the help of our running example (Annex A.1).
Example: We will use UMLSec notations to specify and design secure online banking
system. As discussed in the example (Annex A.1), online banking is a web based application.
The main banking application is hosted in a secure server and clients get access to the banking
service by using web browser.  In Figure 4.7 we see that web server gets the password from
the client application, which is running on client’s browser. As this data is very confidential
so it should be passed through a secure link. A class with a stereotype <<secure link>>
and adversary tag is used to define the appropriate level of security.  But as the data is
going through ordinary Internet communication link. It needs extra (e.g., confidentiality,
integrity) protection.
In open Internet the secrecy of the data may be compromised in an adversarial environment.
This provokes extra security requirement which should be realized at the design stage. To
fulfill these requirements encrypted and data security stereotype are defined. A class with a
stereotype <<encrypted>> ensures that all the information between the browser and the
online banking server will be encrypted. So, adversary could not interpret or alter the
message. But it does not ensure integrity. To ensure integrity a class with a stereotype
<<data security>> is used. <<data security>> also ensures authenticity by using
integrity and authenticity tags.
4.6  SecureUML
SecureUML (Lodderstedt et al., 2002)  is based on role-based access control with additional
support by specifying authorization constraints.  It embeds role-based access control (RBAC)
policies in UML class diagrams using a UML profile. It defines a vocabulary for annotating
UML based models with information relevant to access control. SecureUML defines a
vocabulary for expressing different aspects of access control, like role, permission and
user-role assignment.
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Figure 4.7 : UMLSec Diagrams
Authorization constraint defines the precondition for granting access to any
operation. Such constraints are expressed using Object Constraint Language (OCL)6.
Authorization constraint gives SecureUML the flexibility to define and verify the
access decision on dynamically changing data. Like UMLSec, SecureUML is also used at the
design stage. We will thoroughly investigate different concepts of SecureUML and will also
try to find the concept alignment with ISSRM domain model in Chapter 6.
Example: We will use SecureUML model on online banking system (Annex A.1).
SecureUML uses its main concepts (e.g., user, role, ModelElement and
permission) to design secure software application. Figure 4.8 shows a scenario of money
transfer. SecureUML is used by the following steps,
1.) Identify Users. In this system Alice is the client of this online bank. So, Alice can be seen
as the user (a class with a stereotype <<user>>) of this system.
2.) Identify Application Roles. Online banking system defines a role (a class with a
stereotype <<role>>) account holder for the client to get the service from the system.
3.) Map Users into Roles. Alice (User) is mapped with the account holder (role)in the
system.
4.) Identify Resources. Bank account (a class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>) is
treated as the resources for this example.
5.) Identify Actions. Stereotype permission (an association class with stereotype
<<permission>>) is used to define the action for the system. It defines different actions by
using attributes ActionType. In this example, viewAccount:read and transfermoney:
updatecan be seen as action.
6 http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/ucacwxe/lectures/3C05-04-05/OCL-Essay.pdf
Server  machine
Online banking system
Acess Sys.
Remote access << secure link >>
{adversary = default}
<< Internet >>
<< encrypted >>
<< data security>>
{adversary,
integrity,
authenticity }
Client  machine
Client application
Browser
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Figure 4.8: SecureUML Diagrams
6.) Identify Authorization Constraints: authorization constraints must be
satisfied before any authorization to apply. It can be seen as the precondition. In this example,
transaction can be done only by the account holder. It is ensured by the constraint Ownership.
7.) Account for Cardinality: SecureUML also shows cardinality. Here, it shows one-to-
many relationship between Account holder and Bank account.
SecureUML Metamodel
The SecureUML meta model (Figure 4.9) is represented by the role-based access control
(RBAC) concepts.  It introduces three new concepts User, Role and Permission.
Due to the design decision, every UML model element is represented as a protected resource
and defined as a class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>. <<ResourceSet>> is used
to represent a user defined set of model elements. An association class with a stereotype
<<Permission>> is a relation object connecting a role to a ModelElement or a
ResourceSet. The semantics of a permission is defined by the ActionType (attributes
of Permission) elements used to classify the permission. Every Action-Type represents a
class of security relevant operations on a particular type of protected resource. Action types
give the developer a vocabulary to express permissions at a level close to the domain
vocabulary. A class with a stereotype <<Role>> is a job or function within an organization. It
combines all privileges needed to fulfill the respective job or function.
An AuthorizationConstraint is a part of the access control policy of an application.
It expresses a precondition imposed on every call to an operation of a particular resource,
which usually depends on the dynamic state of the resource, the current call, or the
environment.
<<User>>
Alice
<<AuthorizationConstraint>>
Ownership
call.current.owner.holderna
me=name
<<Permission>>
Client permission
viewAccount: read
transfermoney: update << ModelElement >>
Bank account
-name
-acc. no
-balance
+display()
+deposit()
+withdraw()
roleholder
<<Role>>
Account holder owner account
11 1 1..*holdername
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Figure 4.9:  SecureUML Metamodel (Adapted from Lodderstedt et al., 2002)
4.7  Summary
The syntax and semantics of the security extension of UML diagrams are discussed by using
an example in this chapter. Among the discussed modeling languages, Mal activity diagrams,
SecureUML and UMLSec are used at the design stage.
Table 4.1 shows  the summary of the concepts  of the approaches presented in this chapter. In
the first column, Threat definition, we have shown how threat (malicious acts) is realized by
the specific modeling language. Phase in software development cycle shows the level at
which the modeling language is used. UML notations mean which UML concept and notation
is used in the modeling language. In Mitigation mechanism column, we have discussed how
the security related concepts are addressed in the modeling process. Tools column shows
whether the modeling language has any tools to generate code from the model or not.
We will further investigate Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML for ISSRM domain model
concepts for the alignment with ISSRM domain model in later chapters (Chapter 5 and 6). We
choose these two approaches because of the following reasons,
1. As this research is focused on design stage, we select modeling languages that work at the
design stage.
2. Mal activity diagrams are selected because it is used from late requirement to design stage.
We have already seen concept alignment of requirement engineering languages (e.g., Secure
Tropos and Misuse case) in Chapter 3. So, Mal activity diagrams will be more smooth and
continuous move between requirement engineering and design stage.
3. We select SecureUML because it is defined with an explicit meta model. It also provides
overall security control mechanism for secure information system.
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Table 4.1 : A Comparative Study of Security Modeling Language
Name Threat
definition
Phase in
Software
development
cycle
UML
notations
Mitigation
mechanism
Tools
Abuse case
diagrams
By
introducing
abuse case
and textual
description
Late
requirement
stage
Use case By Introducing
Use case but in
different
diagrams
No
Misuse case
diagrams
By
introducing
misuser,
misuse case
and textual
description.
Late
requirement
stage
Use case By Introducing
Use case
(security use
case) in the
same diagram
No
Mal activity
Diagrams
It uses Mal-
swimlane,
Mal-activity
and Mal-
decision
Late
requirements
to design
stage
Activity
diagram
Uses
Mitigation
Activity and
MitigationLink
No
UMLSec By
introducing
UML profile
with
stereotypes,
tags and
Design stage The
whole
UML
profile
Uses UML
profile and
tags.
Yes
SecureUML By combining
class with
stereotype
<<role>> and
an association
class with
stereotype
<<permission>>
Design stage Mainly
class
diagrams
Uses
Authorization
Constraint
No
(But MS
visio
template
is
available7)
7 http://www.secureuml.com-about.com/
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PART  II
II. Security Risk
Management for IS Design
This part presents the concept alignment of ISSRM domain model and design level modeling
languages. It consists of two chapters.
In the fifth chapter, Alignment of Mal Activity Diagrams with ISSRM Domain Model, we
discuss about how Mal activity diagrams can support security risk management following
ISSRM domain model. We use Mal activity diagrams constructs to discuss an online banking
example (Annex A.1) following ISSRM process. We also present the asset modeling, threat
modeling and security treatment modeling of the given example by using Mal activity
diagrams constructs. The output of the chapter is a concept alignment table (Table 5.1).
In the sixth chapter, Alignment of SecureUML with ISSRM Domain Model, We discuss about
the concept alignment of SecureUML and ISSRM domain model. Here, we use the same
research method and example as Chapter 5. The outcome of this chapter is an alignment table
(Table 6.1) between SecureUML and ISSRM domain model.
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CHAPTER 5
Alignment of Mal Activity Diagrams with
ISSRM  Domain Model
In this chapter we will look into the security modeling language at the design stage, more
specifically, Mal activity diagrams (Sindre, 2007). In section 4.5, we have introduced Mal
activity diagrams. Here we will follow the method described in Section 3.1 to understand how
Mal activity diagrams could support security risk management. Our observations will result
into a concept alignment between ISSRM concepts and Mal activity diagrams constructs. We
will investigate how the concepts of Mal activity diagrams addresses the security risk
management issues at the design stage by using a running example (Annex A.1). This will
contribute to our third research question: How could the security modeling language support
security risk management at the design stage?
We will narrow down our running example of online banking system to email correspondence
between bank official and client to understand, identify and comprehend the security risk
related concepts in detail. We will use ISSRM process (discussed in Section 2.2.3) to identify
and investigate security risk management concepts of email correspondence by using the
concrete syntax of Mal activity diagrams.
5.1 Modeling with Mal Activity Diagrams
In this section we will analyze how Mal activity diagrams support ISSRM concepts by using
the online banking example (Annex A.1). We will follow ISSRM process and use Mal
activity diagrams constructs to analyze security risk management concepts of the online
banking system example here.
(a) Context and Asset Identification. In Figure 5.1, we present a context of our example- it
is shown by activity diagram for online bank. It shows email correspondence between bank
employee and the bank client, more specifically the bank employee has sent an email by
asking the client to update his home address. In this diagram three actors are presented by
client, bank official and online banking servers (represented as Mal activity diagrams
construct swimlane).
The bank official is used to Send email to update the home address (Activity) to start the
process. The client receives email (Activity) and then opens email (Activity). Next, he
loads the website (Activity) in the web browser and browses the login page. In the login
page he puts the username and password (Activity) and pushes login button
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(Activity). Then the login information (username and password) is sent to the online
banking sever (Swimlane). The server validates the user (Decision), if the account exits
in the system then it redirects the user to his homepage (Activity). The client then updates
the home address (Activity) and logout (Activity) from the system. If the client’s
account does not exist or provides wrong username or password then he will be redirected to
the login page again.
Bank has a standard procedure to create the account for the client. After creating the login
credentials, bank officials send this login information to the client. The client can then login to
the system by using these credentials.  He can also change his password to ensure that nobody
knows his password.
(b) Security Objective Determination. Security objectives are often defined in terms of
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Mal activity diagrams deal with the dynamic
behavior of the system and does not support security constraint of the static information (e.g.,
login information). Here, maintain the integrity of the message sending process can be seen as
the security objective.
(c) Risk Analysis and Assessment. In Figure 5.2 we identify malicious activities which are
done by Hacker (Mal-swimlane).  The Hacker targets login information of the client. If
the Hacker can successfully collect the login information of the client he can bypass online
bank account creation procedure. That will violate the integrity of the overall login procedure
of the system. With this login information hacker can login to the account of the client that
will threaten the integrity of the total login system.
The process starts with a malicious activity Send an email with malware (Mal-activity).
It is sent by a malicious actor Hacker (Mal-Swimlane). The client is used to Receives email
and also open the email. Then another malicious activity Silent installation of malware (Mal-
activity) will install the malware in the client machine. After that when client Puts the
username and password, this malware will send this login information to the hacker. The
Hacker will Receive  login information (Mal-activity). Now with this login information
the hacker can login to the bank account and do all kinds of activities that the client is
authorized to do. Here the vulnerabilities of the system lie in the email system and in the
client machine. Hackers exploit these vulnerabilities and gain access to the client’s account.
(d) Risk Treatment. In this step we choose one out of four risk treatment procedures. We are
choosing risk reduction (taking actions to lessen the probability and negative consequences of
the risk)  rather than risk avoidance (decision is taken for not to get involved in any risk
situation).  Here, we are not taking any decision to avoid the situation but trying to improve
the security measure to lessen its probability and effect.
(e) Security requirements definition. In Figure 5.3, we Enable email filtering
(MitigationActivity) which provide safeguard against malicious email. Setup anti-
malware (MitigationActivity) will provide safe guard against malware installation
and Enable traffic scanner (MitigationActivity) is used to monitor the message
packets that are received and sent from the client’s computer. If any malicious traffic is
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detected, it will notify the user. Enable email filtering is used before (MitigationLink)
Receive email, Setup anti-malware before (MitigationLink) Load the website and
Enable traffic scanner before (MitigationLink) Send the login info.
(f ) Control Selection and Implementation. We can see the security module as a security
solution for the system which will implement the security requirements.
Figure 5.1: Asset modeling: message sending process
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Push login button Validate the user
Redirect to
home page
Send
error
message
Logout
[Valid] [Not valid]
Update the home
address
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Figure 5.2: Threat Modeling by Mal Activity Diagrams
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Figure 5.3: Modeling of Security Requirements
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5.2 Mal Activity Diagrams and ISSRM Domain Model
(a) Asset-related Concepts. ISSRM asset represents anything that has value for the
organization and also plays a vital role to achieve the organization’s goal. Business asset is
defined as the information, process, skill that is essential for the business. Activity diagrams
are used to show the process in any organization. Thus its constructs: Activity,
Decision and ControlFlow are mapped with the business asset. IS asset is something
that supports business asset. In Mal activity diagrams, Swimlane holds all the constructs
and helps to show the sequence of the process with specific actor. Activity, Decision
and ControlFlow are also used to support the business asset. So, Activity,
Decision, ControlFlow and Swimlane are aligned with IS asset. There is no Mal
activity diagrams construct for representing security criterion.
(b) Risk-related Concepts. Malicious actor (Hacker) initiates the Mal-activity(e.g.,
Send an email with malware) which can be seen as the ISSRM attack method. Attack method
also includes Mal-Swimlane, Mal-decision and ControlFlow which help to
execute the Mal-activity. Hacker (Mal-Swimlane) resembles the threat agent. A
threat is represented by the combination of threat agent and attack method. Vulnerability of
the IS asset can be identified as no means to scan for incoming email, no controls to check the
legibility of installation, no controls for outgoing traffic. Impact of the Mal-activity on
the system can be seen as loss of integrity of the message sending process which will harm to
the identified asset. Lastly, Mal activity diagrams do not have any visual means to present
risk, vulnerability, event and impact for the system.
(c) Risk Treatment-related Concepts. The MitigationActivity (e.g., Enable email
filtering in Figure 5.3) can be seen as the countermeasures for a Mal-activity. Mal
activity diagrams also show in which place MitigationActivity should be
implemented by MitigationLink. Finally, security module (Swimlane) provides the
means to improve the security of the system by implementing the security requirements. So,
Swimlane can be mapped with the ISSRM security control.
The following table (Table 5.1) shows the concept alignment of Mal activity diagrams and
ISSRM domain model. Under the Mal activity diagrams column we write down the graphical
constructs of Mal activity diagrams that relate to the ISSRM concepts. In the next column we
show the element of example.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we have shown the concept alignment between ISSRM domain model and Mal
activity diagrams. We have discussed the running example (Annex A.1) using Mal activity
diagrams constructs and by following ISSRM process. Then we align the constructs with
concepts of the ISSRM domain model. The final outcome of this chapter is an alignment table
(Table 5.1) which is a semantic alignment between ISSRM domain model concept and Mal
activity diagrams constructs.
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Table 5.1: Concept Alignment Between Mal activity Diagrams and ISSRM Domain Model
ISSRM domain model Mal activity diagrams
Mal activity diagram Example
As
set
rel
ate
d
con
cep
ts Asset -- --Business
asset
Activity,
Decision,
ControlFlow
Send email to update the home address,
Receive email,
Open email,
Load the website ,
Put the username and password,
Push login button,
Update the home address,
Logout
Is filter working?
Is anti-malware working?
Is traffic scanner working?
IS asset Swimlane,
Activity,
ControlFlow,
Decision
Bank official, Online banking server,
Validate the user,
Redirect to the home page,
Send error message,
Is valid?
Security
criterion
-- Integrity of the message sending
process (Fig. 5.1)
Ris
kr
ela
ted
 co
nce
pts Risk -- --Impact -- Loss of integrity of the message
sending process
Event -- --
Vulnerab
ility
-- No means to scan for incoming email,
No controls to check the legibility of
installation,
No controls for outgoing traffic
Threat Mal-activity,
Mal-Swimlane,
Mal-decision,
ControlFlow
Send an email with malware,
Silent installation of malware,
Send the login info. to the hacker,
Receive login information
Hacker
Threat
agent
Mal-Swimlane Hacker
Attack
method
Mal-activity,
Mal-decision,
ControlFlow
Mal-Swimlane,
Send an email with malware,
Silent installation of malware,
Send the login info. to the hacker,
Receive  login information
Malware
Ris
k
tre
atm
ent
rel
ate
d
con
cep
t Risk
treatment
-- Risk reduction
Security
requirem
ent
MitigationActivity,
MitigationLink
Enable email filtering,
Setup anti-malware,
Enable traffic scanner
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Control Swimlane Security module
This concept alignment has shown several limitations of Mal activity diagrams to investigate
security risk management at the design stage of the information system development process.
One of the main drawbacks is that it cannot present static security criteria (e.g. confidentiality
of login information). We suggest couple of improvements for Mal activity diagrams, in the
context of security risk management:
 Mal activity diagrams (Sindre, 2007) do not provide guide line how to use its
construct. This sometimes may create confusion when we wants to use it in ISSRM
process. For example, Activity is used for both business asset and IS asset. One
possible solution is to use different color like irregular activities
(irregular activities performed in good faith (grey)(Sindre, 2007)).
 There is no published (e.g., in conference or journal) work available on how to use
(process definition) Mal activity diagrams. So, a process definition(e.g., 5 steps
process for Abuse case diagrams (Mayer, 2009)) should be prepared to use it correctly
and efficiently.
 No published meta model is available for Mal activity diagrams. We have proposed
one in section 4.4 (Figure 4.5 and 4.6).  This will help to understand the constructs and
their relationship.
 Mal activity diagrams could be improved with additional construct to better cover the
concepts of ISSRM. In table 5.1, we see that Mal activity diagrams does not have
construct to represent some ISSRM domain model concepts (e.g., security criterion,
risk, impact, vulnerability, risk treatment). One possible solution is to propose new
construct or to provide methodological guideline how to use the existing concepts in
the diagram.
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CHAPTER 6
Alignment of SecureUML with ISSRM
Domain Model
In this chapter we will analyze how SecureUML (Lodderstedt, 2002) supports security risk
management. We have introduced SecureUML constructs, meta model and related concepts in
Section 4.6. Like the previous chapter, we will follow the same method (in Section 3.1) to
map SecureUML to the ISSRM domain model. We will base our analysis on the online
banking scenario (Annex A.1). The outcome of this chapter will be a semantic alignment table
between SecureUML and ISSRM domain model. It will help the developers to realize security
risk management concepts in terms of SecureUML constructs at the design stage. This will
also contribute to our third research question: How could the security modeling language
support security risk management at the design stage?
6.1 Modeling with SecureUML
Here, we will follow ISSRM process (in Section 2.2.3) and SecureUML constructs to analyze
the our running example (Annex A.1).
(a) Context and Asset Identification. In Figure 6.1 we illustrate the context of our example.
We assume that there are two roles: Client and Bank (represented as a class with a stereotype
<<Role>> ) are used for Bank account control management. The client can access
BankAccount (a class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>) and transfer  money by using
its operations (e.g., deposit(), withdraw()).  The attribute (e.g., balance) of the Bank account
shows the current balance of the account. The authorization on BankAccount for Client is
assigned by ClientPermission (an association class with a stereotype <<Permission>>).
The client can read and update (ActionType) the BankAccount information. Like the
client role, Bank officer role is also authorized to the account by Permission
(BankOfficerPermission). Bank officer can perform read, create and delete (ActionType)
operation on BankAccount. One client can have more than one accounts and one account
can be managed by more than one Bank officers. Bank officer also can manage many
accounts.
(b) Security Objective Determination. Security objectives are often defined in terms of
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Here, we are concerned about the manipulation of
balance information. Thus, we focus on the integrity of the balance (an attribute of a class
with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>) information.
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Figure 6.1: Asset Modeling by SecureUML
(c) Risk Analysis and Assessment. In Chapter 5, we have seen that malicious actor (Hacker
represented as a class with a stereotype <<Role>>) can steal the login information by using
email system and malware (shown in Figure 5.2). Here we are assuming that the hacker has
already received the login information. When the hacker will login to the system with the
stolen login information he will get the same access level like Client (Figure 6.2). Now, he
can execute all kinds of operation (e.g., illegalTransfer: update represented as  attribute an
association class with a stereotype <<Permission>>) on the Bank account as Client.
(d) Risk Treatment. In this step we choose one out of four risk treatment procedures. We are
choosing risk reduction (taking actions to lessen the probability and negative consequences of
the risk)  rather than risk avoidance (decision is taken for not to get involved in any risk
situation).  Here we are not taking any decision to avoid the situation but trying to improve
the security measure to lessen its probability and effect.
<<Permission>>
ClientPermission
viewAccount: read
transfermoney: update
<<Permission>>
BankOfficerPermission
viewAccount: read
createAccount: create
deleteAccount: delete
<<Role>>
BankOfficer
<<Role>>
Client owner
accountManager
account
listOfAccount
1
1..*
1..*
1..*
<< ModelElement >>
BankAccount
-name
-acc. no
-balance
+display()
+deposit()
+withdraw()
+createNew()
+deleteAcc()
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Figure 6.2: Threat Modeling by SecureUML
(e) Security Requirements Definition. By setting AuthorizationConstraint we
can put our security requirement (Figure 6.3). Here, constraint (OneTimePassword) will
ensure that even if the login information is compromised the malicious actor (Hacker) cannot
transfer (transfermoney:update attribute of an association class with a stereotype
<<Permission>>) money to other account.
To ensure this AuthorizationConstraint to work every client should be given a
printed one time code book. They will use this code as the confirmation of any create, update
or delete operation on Bank account. For example, this code is used to confirm the money
transfer. The main characteristic of this code is that it can be used only once and after that it
becomes invalid. The banking system check this code with the code book for that specific
client. So, even if the hacker steal the login information he can only see (illegalView: read)
the account information. If he tries to transfer money he will be prompted for the one time
code as confirmation.  As he does not  have access to this one time code book he could not
transfer the money to his account.
<<Permission>>
ClientPermission
viewAccount: read
transfermoney: update
<<Role>>
Hacker
<<Role>>
Client owner
theif
account
account
1
1..*
1..*
1
<<Permission>>
ExploitationPermission
illegalView: read
illegalTransfer: update
<< ModelElement >>
BankAccount
-name
-acc. no
-balance
+display()
+deposit()
+withdraw()
+createNew()
+deleteAcc()
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Figure 6.3: Modeling of Security Requirements
(f ) Control Selection and Implementation.
From this model we can transform to implementation (Matulevičius, 2011). The overall
model defines rather a control mechanism and links it to the secured assets  than separate
concepts of ISSRM.
6.2 SecureUML and ISSRM Domain Model
(a) Asset-related Concepts. ISSRM asset is anything that is valuable and vital for achieving
the origination’s goal. Business asset is defined as the information, process, plan and skill
essential to the business. In SecureUML, a class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>
(BankAccount) corresponds to protected resources. Protected resources represent the module
that is valuable for online banking system to provide services. Thus a class with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>> can be mapped with asset. We align BankAccount with ISSRM asset
rather than business asset because all the information in this class are not critical (e.g., name
or acc. no) for online banking system but needed to provide the service. The attribute
(balance) of the class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>> represents the information that
is critical for the client as well as for banking system. Thus, it is mapped with business asset.
A class with a stereotype <<Role>> provides the way to use this system. An association class
with a stereotype <<Permission>> supports the user with proper authorization to execute
an operation on one or more protected objects or resources. The operation (e.g., withdraw(),
deposit()) of the Bank account is the means which helps to work on the balance information.
In this perspective, these constructs (Role, Permission, Operation of ModelElement) can be
<<Permission>>
ClientPermission
viewAccount: read
transfermoney: update
<<Role>>
Hacker
<<Role>>
Client owner
theif
account
targetAccount
1
1..*
1..*
1
<<Permission>>
ExploitationPermission
illegalView: read
illegalTransfer: update
<<AuthorizationConstraint>>
(OneTimePassword)
call.current.owner.oneTime
Code =
codeForTheCurrentUser
<< ModelElement >>
BankAccount
-name
-acc. no
-balance
+display()
+deposit()
+withdraw()
+createNew()
+deleteAcc()
+getCode()
oneTimeCode
oneTimeCode
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aligned with IS asset. Though SecureUML is focused on security (access control) but it does
not have any construct to represent ISSRM security criteria.
(b) Risk-related Concepts. In principal, SecureUML does not have the support to represent
security risk. “at the methodological level SecureUML only focuses on the solution domain.”
(Matulevičius, 2010).
However, we have used SecureUML to define the threat model (in Figure 6.2) of the running
example to show the negative/harmful effect. Here, hacker (a class with a stereotype
<<Role>>) who takes the unlawful benefits by transferring money illegally (illegalTransfer:
update) can be aligned with threat agent. The means used by the threat agent is attack
method. Thus, the attack method (illegalTransfer: update) can be aligned with the attribute of
an association class with a stereotype <<Permission>>. Hacker uses this permission to
exploit the vulnerability and targets the IS assets. Vulnerability of the IS asset can be defined
implicitly (no security confirmation mechanism before operation is performed). Exploitation
of this vulnerability will result into an impact (Loss of integrity of the money transfer) which
will cause harm to the asset. We can implicitly identify the vulnerability and impact but
SecureUML does not have any construct to represent them. SecureUML also does not have
any construct to define risk and event.
(c) Risk Treatment-related Concepts. It deals with the risk treatment decision and
implementation of security requirements in order to mitigate risk. Here we have selected risk
reduction as a risk treatment decision for our example. ISSRM security requirement is
represented by AuthorizationConstraint (OneTimePassword). This constraint
provides the counter measures against illegal money transfer. The overall SecureUML
approach implements the security requirement. Thus, it can be aligned with control.
Table 6.1 shows the concept alignment of SecureUML and ISSRM concepts.  Under the
SecureUML column we write down the graphical constructs of SecureUML that relates to
the corresponding ISSRM concepts and in the next column we have shown the example.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have shown the concept alignment between ISSRM domain model and
SecureUML. We have analyzed the concepts by using a running example.  The final outcome
of this chapter is an alignment table (Table 6.1). Our analysis shows that SecureUML has
several limitations to define the security risk management concepts. Here we will suggest few
improvement for SecurUML from security risk management perspective.
 Several concepts (e.g., risk, event) do not have any construct to represent. The solution
could be to introduce new stereotypes or tagged values within existing stereotypes.
 Sometimes same constructs (e.g., <<Role>>, <<Permission>>) is represented for
different ISSRM concepts (e.g., IS asset and attack method). Specific tagged value
could be used to differentiate the same constructs (Stereotype).
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Table 6.1: Concept Alignment Between SecureUML and ISSRM Domain Model
ISSRM domain model SecureUML
SecureUML Example
As
set
rel
ate
d
con
cep
t Asset Class with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>>
Bank account
Business
asset
Attributes of the class
with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>>
balance, name, acc. no
IS asset Class with a stereotype
<<Role>>,
Association class with a
stereotype
<<Permission>>,
Operations  of the class
with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>>
Client, Bank Officer
Client permission, Bank officer
permission
display(), deposit(),
withdraw(),viewAccount: read,
createAccount: create, deleteAccount:
delete,  transfermoney: update
Security
criterion
-- Integrity of the balance
Ris
kr
ela
ted
con
cep
t Risk -- --
Impact -- Loss of integrity of the money transfer
Event -- --
Vulnerability -- No security confirmation mechanism
before operation is performed
Threat Class with a stereotype
<<Role>>, Association
class with a stereotype
<<Permission>>
Transfer money by malicious actor
Threat agent Class with a stereotype
<<Role>>
Hacker
Attack
method
Attributes of an
association class with a
stereotype
<<Permission>>
illegalView: read
illegalTransfer: update
Ris
k t
rea
tm
ent
rel
ate
d
con
cep
t Risk
treatment
-- Risk reduction
Security
requirement
Authorization constraint OneTimePassword
Control The whole model as
control
Bank account control management
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Part III
IV.  Validation
This part presents validation of our alignment.
In Chapter 7, we perform a case study by using Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML. We
use two different but sequel scenarios from the case study. We identify the key instances of
the case study and investigate how they are represented by Mal activity diagrams and
SecureUML following ISSRM process. We also find out ISSRM domain model concepts
which best fit for these elements. Thus, we have got two alignment tables (Table 7.1 and
Table 7.2). We check alignment of these two tables with Table 5.1 and Table 6.1 to validate
the concept alignment. This investigation validates our proposed alignment in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6. Finally, we discuss threat to validity to show the limitation of the validation
process.
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CHAPTER 7
Validation
In this chapter, we will validate the concept alignment of security modeling languages(e.g.,
Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML) with ISSRM domain model. We will use a case study
(described in Section 7.2) about banking information which is exposed to social
engineering(Mitnick, 2002) attack to validate our alignment (Table 5.1 and Table 6.1).
7.1 Method of Validation
We will analyze and identify the components of the case study from the security risk
management perspective. We will model the case study by Mal activity diagrams and
SecureUML. Then we will find out what construct of modeling language is used to represent
the element of the case study  and to which ISSRM concept the element is matched. Now we
take each element and will see the alignment between the construct of the modeling language
and ISSRM domain model for this element. Then we will look into our proposed alignment
(Table 5.1 for Mal activity diagrams and 6.1 for SecureUML) table to verify that whether the
same construct of the modeling language matches with same ISSRM concepts for both the
case or not. If we find match for all the elements then it will validate our proposed alignment.
7.2 The Credit Chex Case Study
When someone goes to the bank to open a bank account, the bank uses some third parties to
verify his personal information and financial status. Credit chex is such kind of third party
organization which provides information to the banks.
Whenever the bank needs the verification, they call credit chex and credit chex replies with
the information. To improve the service quality credit chex conducts survey about the service
and customer satisfaction from time to time. For the survey they call the banks and discuss
about the survey questions and get the response.
The survey is done through telephone. The bank official does not check the phone number of
the caller when they answer to the survey questions. This may lead to a social engineering
attack. The attacker may have collect secret information which he can use to disguise himself
as a bank official to the credit chex office and collect client’s personal and financial
information. A social engineering method on this case study is presented in (Mitnick, 2002).
We will analyze it using Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML in the following sections.
7.3 Managing Risks Using Mal Activity Diagrams
In this survey procedure there are two users: bank officials and credit chex official.
Bank Officials. Bank official knows the banking information that the credit chex official
wants to know in the survey. The credit chex official asks him for a survey. If he agrees to
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participate then the surveyor will start asking questions. During the survey the bank official
can skip any question.
Credit Chex Official. He is used to ask the bank official for the survey. He can be accepted
or rejected by the bank official. If the bank official agrees to answer his survey questions he
will ask the questions. He also writes down the responses of the questions.
Figure 7.1: Modeling of Survey Process by Mal activity diagrams
Figure 7.1 shows a survey scenario. The survey starts by asking (Ask for the survey
represented as activity in Mal activity diagrams) the banking official for the survey. Bank
official can Agree to Participate (Decision) or not. If he agrees to answer the survey
question, the credit chex official will Ask the question (activity). If the bank official
Agrees to answer (Decision) then the credit chex official will Ask the question
(activity)and he will Answer the question (activity). The check chex official will
then Record the answer(activity). The credit chex official check whether the survey is
finished or not (Is survey finished?) after recording the answer. He will also check if the bank
official skips any question (Agree to answer? as Decision) or not. If the survey is not
finished (Is survey finished? as Decision) then the surveyor will ask the next question.
In Figure 7.2, we can see how an attacker (Mal-swimlane) can reveal the secret
information (e.g., merchant-id) by manipulating the survey procedure. In this case he will
disguise himself and act like a legitimate credit chex official to the bank official. In this
scenario, he breaks the integrity of the survey and Asks mal-questions (Mal-activity).
Bank official Credit chex official
Ask for the survey
[Yes][No]
Agree to
Participate?
Ask the question
Agree to answer?
Is survey
finished?Answer the question Record the
answer
[Yes]
[No]
[Yes] [No]
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This mal-questions (e.g., What is your bank’s Merchant-ID?) will reveal the secret
information. Usually, when (Time to ask mal-question? Represented as Mal-decision)
the attacker will gain the confidence of the bank official, he will ask this mal question.
Figure 7.2: Social Engineering Attack on Survey Process
If the bank officials are not security aware he may find this question (e.g., What is your
bank’s Merchant-ID?) as harmless because he used to use this information publicly with his
colleague as well as with credit chex officials. If the malicious user gets this information he
can later use this information. He may disguise himself as a bank official to the credit chex
office and ask any information about any specific client. Later he may use this information for
unlawful activities (e.g., identity theft) or sell it to others.
The security mechanism should be in place to avoid this kind of disclosure. Figure 7.3 shows
the security mechanism how to protect merchant-id.  The bank can store the credit chex phone
number that they use for conversation. Then the bank official can Check the phone number
(MitigationActivity) before (MitigationLink) they reply to the survey questions.
It is not a full proof solution because sometimes malicious user can tamper the phone system
and steal the caller id. The bank officials should be trained (Check legitimacy of question as
MitigationActivity) about this kind of situation. So that even if the malicious actor
manages to tamper the phone he could not reveal the secret information from the bank
employee.
Bank official Attacker
Ask for the survey
[Yes][No]
Agree to
participate? Ask the question
Agree to answer?
Is survey
finished?Answer the question Record the
answer
[Yes]
[No]
Ask mal-question
[No]
[Yes]
Time to ask
mal-question?
[Yes] [No]
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Figure 7.3: Security Requirements to Protect the Integrity of the Survey Process
7.4 Managing Risks Using SecureUML
We are assuming that the attacker has gained the merchant-id by a successful attack
(presented in Figure 7.2). Here we will focus on  how the attacker uses this secret information
to gain access to client’s personal and financial information (a class with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>>) (Figure 7.4).
In SecureUML a bank employee use the position of a BankOfficial (represented as a class
with a stereotype <<role>>)to get access to the client’s information.
Attacker
Check
legitimacy of
question
Check the
phone number
Ask the
question
Answer the
question
Record
answer
Ask mal-
question
Agree to
participate?
Participate?Agree to
answer?
[Yes][No]
[Yes] [No]
[No]
[Yes]
[Yes]
[No]
Time to ask
mal-question?
Is survey
finished?
Ask for
the survey
Security moduleBank official
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Figure 7.4: Modeling Client’s Information System by SecureUML
The authorization is given to bank employee by BankOfficerPermission (an association class
with a stereotype <<Permission>>). The bank employee may ask and get
(collectInformation: read as an attribute of an association class with a stereotype
<<Permission>>) these information from the credit chex office.
The bank official is interested about the personalInformation and financialStatus (both
represented as attribute of the class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>) from the
ClientInformation system. He accesses this vital information by using getInformation()
method (represented as operation of the class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>). Whenever
the bank employee wants to access this information he has to provide merchant-Id
(represented as an attribute of the class with a stereotype <<Role>>) of the bank for
authentication.
Figure 7.5 shows what information an attacker can get if he gains access to client’s
information. Here, the attacker disguises himself as bank official (pre-condition: successful
attack described in Figure 7.2) and gains the permission (ExploitationPermission as an
association class with a stereotype <<Permission>>) on the client’s information.
This is a violation of client’s privacy and the confidentiality of the information is revealed to
unauthorized person. The attacker can now use this information for other illegal activities
(e.g., identity theft) or also can sell this information to third parties.
BankPhoneNumber (AuthorizationConstraint) is used to put constraint on the
(protected)information in SecureUML (in Figure 7.6).  Here, we use some constraint to
mitigate the risk identified in Figure 7.5.  Like the bank (discussed in section 7.3), the credit
chex office should keep the record of the telephone number that the client (Bank) uses to call
for any information. If the credit chex official checks the telephone number before providing
any information to the caller, it will reduce the risk.
<<Role>>
BankOfficial bankEmployee clientInformation
1..* 1..*
<< ModelElement >>
ClientInformation
- personalInformation
- financialStatus
<<Permission>>
BankOfficerPermission
collectInformation: read
merchant-Id
+ getInformation()
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Figure 7.5: An attacker’s Access Level to the Client’s Information System
Figure 7.6: Use of an Authorization Constraint to the Client’s Information System
<<Role>>
Attacker thief targetedInformation
1..* 1..*
<< ModelElement >>
ClientInformation
- personalInformation
- financialStatus
<<Permission>>
ExploitationPermission
illegalInfoCollection: read
bankEmployee clientInformation
1..* 1..*
<<Permission>>
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collectInformation: read
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(BankPhoneNumber)
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eNumber = listOfPhoneNumber
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<<Role>>
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+ getInformation()
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1..* 1..*
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ExploitationPermission
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7.5  Observation
In Section 7.3 , we have used Mal activity diagrams to present the survey procedure and in
Section 7.4, we have used SecureUML to present the correspondence between bank official
and the credit chex official for client’s information. Now we will use the validation method
discussed in Section 7.1 to validate our work.
7.5.1  A Case of Mal Activity Diagrams
In this Section we will discuss about the elements of the case study as presented in Figure 7.1,
7.2 and 7.3 and analyze them. The first element “Ask for the survey” is represented as an
activity in the diagram (Figure 7.1). This element is a vital part of the survey process. So,
from this perspective it matches with the ISSRM business asset. Thus, activity is aligned
with ISSRM business asset for this element. If we get back to Table 5.1, we see that
activity is aligned with ISSRM business asset. This validates our alignment of
activity with business asset in Table 5.1.
Now we will look into another element of the model “Agree to participate?”. This is a choice
(represented as decision in Figure 7.1) taken by the bank official. If he agrees then the
survey process will continue otherwise the process will terminate there. So, it is a vital
business decision for the survey procedure. Thus, this element is aligned with ISSRM
business asset. If we look into Table 5.1,  we see that decision is also aligned with
business asset there. This also validates our alignment in Table 5.1.
In the survey process  “Bank official” (represented as Swimlane in Figure 7.1) is playing
supporting role by providing information to the credit chex official. From this perspective
bank official can be aligned with IS asset. If we see in Table 5.1, we find that Swimlane is
aligned with IS asset. This also validates our alignment in Table  5.1.
The “Attacker” (represented as Mal-swimlane in Figure 7.2)  disguises himself as a credit
chex official to the bank and reveals the secret information. Thus it resembles with ISSRM
threat agent. Mal-swimlane is also aligned with threat agent in Table 5.1. Therefore,
this validates our alignment in Table  5.1.
An attacker is used to  “Ask mal-question” (represented as Mal-activity in Figure 7.2) in
order to disclose the secret information (e.g., merchant-id). This activity helps him to gain
unauthorized information. From this perspective, it is aligned with ISSRM attack method. In
Table 5.1, Mal-activity is also aligned with attack method. Thus, it validates our
alignment in Table 5.1.
By using “Time to ask mal-question?” (represented as Mal-decision in Figure 7.2) the
attacker choose the right time for asking the mal-question. As this decision is related to a
harmful action so it is aligned with ISSRM action method. In Table 5.1, Mal-decision is
also aligned with attack method. Thus, it validates our alignment in Table 5.1.
The element “Check the phone number” (represented as MitigationActivity in Figure
7.3) is used to mitigate the risk described in Figure 7.2.  Thus it is matched with ISSRM
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security requirement concept. In Table 5.1, MitigationActivity is also aligned with
security requirement. Thus, it validates our alignment in Table 5.1.
The “Security module” (represented as Swimlane in Figure 7.3) provides the means to
implement the security requirements to countermeasure the potential risk. So, it is aligned
with ISSRM control. If we look at Table 5.1, we see that Swimlane is also aligned with
ISSRM control. This also validates our proposed alignment in Table 5.1.
In Table 7.1, we have presented the concept alignment between Mal activity diagrams and
ISSRM domain model focusing on the elements of the case study.
Table 7.1: Concept Alignment Between Mal activity Diagrams and ISSRM Domain Model
Serial
No.
Element of the case study Mal activity diagrams ISSRM domain
model
1. Ask for the survey Activity
[Ask for the survey]
Business asset
2. Agree to participate? Decision
[Agree to participate?]
Business asset
3. Bank official Swimlane
[Bank official]
IS asset
4. Attacker Mal-swimlane [Attacker] Threat agent
5. Ask mal-question Mal-activity
[Ask mal-question]
Attack method
6. Time to ask mal-question? Mal-decision
[Time to ask mal-question?]
Attack method
7. Check the phone number MitigationActivity
[Check the phone number]
Security
requirement
8. Security module Swimlane [Security module] Control
7.5.2  A Case of SecureUML
In this Section we will discuss about the scenario presented by SecureUML in Figure 7.4, 7.5
and 7.6.
In Figure 7.4, we see how a bank official accesses the “ClientInformation” (a class with a
stereotype <<ModelElement>>) from the credit chex office. Client’s information is the vital
information for the system. Thus it resembles to ISSRM asset. If we see the alignment in
Table 6.1, we see that a class with a stereotype << ModelElement >> is aligned with asset.
So, the mapping here validates our alignment in Table 6.1.
The critical information for the business are “personalInformation” and “financialStatus”
(both are attribute of the class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>). Thus it aligns with the
ISSRM business asset. In Table 6.1, an attribute of the class with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>> is also aligned with business asset. Thus, this alignment here validates
our proposed alignment in Table 6.1.
The bank employee gets the authorization on client’s information by
“BankOfficerPermission” (an association class with a stereotype <<Permission>>). This
permission enables the bank official to access client’s information, so it is aligned with
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ISSRM IS asset. An association class with a stereotype <<Permission>> is also aligned
with IS asset in Table 6.1. Therefore, the alignment here validates our alignment in Table 6.1.
The bank employee gets access to the client’s information by using “getInformation()”
method (operation of the class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>>). Since it helps to get the
desired information it maps with ISSRM IS asset. In Table 6.1, we see that operation of the
class with a stereotype <<ModelElement>> is aligned with IS asset. Thus, this validates our
alignment in Table 6.1.
If an “Attacker” (a class with a stereotype <<Role>>) gains access to the system, he can reveal
the secret information and can use it for illegal activities (e.g., identity theft) or sell it to other
parties. Thus it can be mapped with ISSRM threat agent. In Table 6.1, a class with a
stereotype <<Role>> is also aligned with threat agent. Therefore, it validates our alignment in
Table 6.1.
The attacker uses “illegalInfoCollection: read” (an association class with a stereotype
<<Permission>>) to gain illegal access to the client’s information. So, it can be mapped
with ISSRM attack method. In Table 6.1, an attribute of an association class with a stereotype
<<Permission>> is also aligned with attack method. Thus, this validates our alignment in
Table 6.1.
“BankPhoneNumber” (AuthorizationContraint)is used to mitigate the risk
(presented in Figure 7.5) and can be aligned with ISSRM security requirement. In Table 6.1,
AuthorizationConstraint is also aligned with security requirement. Therefore, it
validates our alignment in Table 6.1.
The whole system is designed by using role based access control which implements
mitigation procedure to protect client’s information. So, from this perspective the whole
SecureUML approach is aligned with ISSRM control. In Table 6.1, the Whole SecureUML
model is also aligned with control. Thus, the alignment here validates our alignment in Table
6.1.
In Table 7.2, we have presented the concept alignment between SecureUML and ISSRM
domain model focusing on the elements of the case study.
7.6  Threat to Validity
The ideal case study is quite impossible to reach. A case study always suffers of limitations –
also called threats to its validity. General limitations of case studies are, for example:
 Reduction of the domain of the IS in order to fit the scope of the problem to treat;
 Increased focus on positive results and vague discussion of negative outcomes.
In Credit Chex case study, we have modeled the case study using the Mal activity diagrams
and SecureUML. Ideally, this work should be done by two distinct teams without being aware
of how the other team is modeling with another language.  Indeed, in this case , we played the
triple role of designer, analyst and judge of the modeling of the case study and the analysis of
alignment between Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML  with the ISSRM domain model.
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Table 7.2: Concept Alignment Between SecureUML and ISSRM Domain Model
Serial
No.
Element of the case study SecureUML ISSRM domain
model
1. ClientInformation Class with a stereotype
<<ModelElement>>
[ClientInformation]
Asset
2. personalInformation Attribute of the class with a
stereotype <<ModelElement>>
[personalInformation]
Business asset
3. financialStatus Attribute of the class with a
stereotype <<ModelElement>>
[financialStatus]
Business asset
4. BankOfficerPermission Association class with a
stereotype <<Permission>>
[BankOfficerPermission]
IS asset
5. getInformation() Operations  of the class with a
stereotype <<ModelElement>>
[getInformation()]
IS asset
6. Attacker Class with a stereotype
<<Role>>
[Attacker]
Threat agent
7. illegalInfoCollection: read Association class with a
stereotype <<Permission>>
[illegalInfoCollection: read]
Attack method
8. BankPhoneNumber Authorization constraint,
constrainedElement
[BankPhoneNumber]
Security
requirement
9. Secure ClientInformation
system
Whole SecureUML in Fig. 7.6 Control
7.7 Summary
In order to validate our proposed alignments (Table 5.1 and Table 6.1), we have used a case
study here. We have identified the key instances of the case study and examine how they are
represented by these two languages and to which ISSRM concepts they match. Then we have
checked alignment of each element here with the alignment in Table 5.1 and Table 6.1. Our
analysis here validates our proposed alignment in Table 5.1 and Table 6.1. Finally, we have
discussed the limitations of case study and validation process.
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Part IV
V.  Conclusion
In this part, we conclude the thesis. We show the limitation and provide a summary of this
work. We also discuss answers to the research questions and identify the future work.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter we will summarize our thesis work and discuss about the limitations of this
work. We will also provide the conclusion and answer to the research questions. Finally,
recommendations for further research conclude the work.
8.1 Limitation
Like any other scientific study, this work also has some limitations. First of all, it is based on
theoretical discussion and thus contains a certain degree of subjectivity. One of the limitations
is that the work is carried out and validated by only one researcher and revised by another.
This is also based on specific scenario. Thus, it might mean that some aspects of the modeling
languages (e.g., Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML) or its application could be interpreted
and aligned to the ISSRM concepts differently, if the study is performed by other people.
Another thing is that the running example also involves the subjective decisions on how to
model the problem. For example, we have selected to take the risk reduction decision. The
security requirements could be different if one would take the risk avoidance (or other)
decision.
Another shortcoming of this study is that we have focused on specific kind of attack (e.g,
spoofing8) on the running example and ignored many other attack methods (e.g., Man in the
middle attack9, key logger10). Although the example is taken from the literature which reports
on a real world scenario but we have not applied it in the practical settings. Thus our analysis
remains based on only on the available literature (e.g., Sindre, 2007, Lodderstedt, 2002).
8.2 Answer to Research Questions
The main research problem addressed in this work, as stated in Chapter 1 is “Support of
security modeling language for security risk management at the design level”.
This research problem is divided into three research questions for investigation. Now we will
discuss our answer to these research questions.
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoofing_attack
9 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Man-in-the-middle_attack
10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keystroke_logging#Software-based_keyloggers
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RQ 1: Is there any domain model which would help to understand security risk management
at design stage?
To answer this question we have surveyed and analyzed different security methods
(e.g., Braber et al., 2007, Mead et al. 2005) and frameworks (e.g., Haley et al. 2006,
Lee et al. 2007). We have resulted in ISSRM domain model (Dubois et al., 2010).
RQ 2: What are potential security modeling languages at the design stage to support
security risk management?
To answer this question we have investigated the concepts and constructs of different
security modeling languages (e.g., Misuse case diagrams, Mal activity diagrams). Some
of these language are used at requirement engineering (e.g., Abuse case diagrams,
Misuse case diagrams) and some are used at the design stage (e.g., Mal activity
diagrams, SecureUMl). This analysis also helps us to understand their concept,
constructs and their usage. We have resulted in Mal activity diagrams and SecureUML.
RQ 3: How could the security modeling language support security risk management at the
design stage?
We have investigated how Mal activity diagrams and SecurUML can support the
security risk management. In our analysis, we  have found that both these languages can
identify and represent business asset, IS asset, threat agent, attack method, threat,
security requirement and control concepts. But they cannot represent security criterion,
risk, event, vulnerability, impact and risk treatment concept.
To finalize our discussion we give the conclusion in the next section.
8.3 Conclusion
Among different security methods (e.g., Braber et al., 2007, Mead et al. 2005), we have
chosen ISSRM domain model (Dubois et al., 2010) to analyze security modeling language at
design stage because of its focus on information system development. The ISSRM domain
model is derived and compliant with exiting security standards. It also supports definition of
security for the key information system constituents and addresses the information system
security risk management process at three conceptual levels: asset related, risk related and
risk treatment related. These levels help us to identify and analyze the element of the
information system from security risk management perspective. Another major reason to
choose the ISSRM domain model is the previous experience (e.g., Mayer, 2009, Matulevičius
et al, 2008). The domain model has already been used to investigate risk management
support in the requirement engineering.
Investigation of existing language alignments (e.g., Mayer, 2009, Matulevičius et al, 2008)
has helped us to understand how we can analyzes the modeling language at the design stage.
After review of the security modeling languages, we have selected Mal activity diagrams and
SecureUML for alignment with the ISSRM domain model. Mal activity diagrams is selected
because it can be used as a linkage between late requirement and design stage. We have
selected SecureUML because it is defined with an explicit meta model and provides overall
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security control mechanism (more specifically role-based access control) for secure
information system development.
We have used the background knowledge for the concept alignment between Mal activity
diagrams and SecureUML to the ISSRM domain model by using an online banking system
example (Annex A.1). Major observations from these alignments (Table 5.1 and Table 6.1)
are,
 Neither of these two languages supports the ISSRM domain model in complete extent.
 Mal activity diagrams can only model dynamic security criteria (e.g., integrity of the
process) but cannot represent static security criteria (e.g., confidentiality of data).
 SecureUML mainly focuses on static security criteria, but it also supports dynamic
security requirements by using authorization constraints.
 Several ISSRM domain model concepts are represented by same constructs (e.g.
Activity is used both for business asset and IS asset). Solution to this could be meta-
labeling, tags or even use different colors in the diagram.
 Modeling languages are not able to specify few ISSRM concepts (e.g., security
criterion, vulnerability, risk). Answer to this problem could be extension of the
modeling languages (at the constructs, meta model and semantics level) by
introducing additional security and security risk constructs.
We have validated our work by in a case study (Mitnick, 2002) which focuses on personal and
financial information management. We have identified the key instances of the case study
then used our proposal to model them following the ISSRM process. We have checked
whether the concept alignment between construct of modeling language and ISSRM concept
focusing on the case study element (Table 7.1 and Table 7.2) matches with our proposed
alignment in Table 5.1 and 6.1.
8.4 Future Work
This work has identified some limitations of the modeling language at design stage. The
major future work is to implement the identified extension to the modeling languages. Before
this implementation could happen, validation should also be done by security experts. Our
analysis also opens the way for the interoperability between different modeling languages that
are analysed using the same conceptual background, thus, potentially leading to the
transformation between different modeling approaches.
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Abstract eesti
Turvariskide modelleerimine süsteemi disaini etapis
SecureUML-i vastavusse viimine ISSRM domeenimudeliga
Mohammad Jabed Morshed Chowdhury
Magistritöö
Turvatehnika disain on üks olulisi süsteemiarenduse komponente. Ta peaks läbima tervet
süsteemiarendusprotsessi. Kahjuks pööratakse talle paljudel juhtudel tähelepanu ainult
süsteemi arendamise ja haldamise ajal.
Paljud turvalise modelleerimise keeled (näiteks Misuse Case, Secure Tropos) aitavad
turvariskejuba nõuete analüüsi etapil hallata. Käesolevas magistritöös vaatleme
modelleerimisvahendeid (pahateoskeemid ja SecureUML), mida kasutatakse süsteemi
disainil. Täpsemalt, me uurime, kuivõrd need vahendid toetavad infosüsteemide turvariskide
haldust (Information Systems Security Risks Management, ISSRM).
Töö tulemuseks on tabel, mis seab pahateoskeemid ning SecureUML-keele konstruktsioonid
ISSRM domeeni mõistetega omavahel vastavusse. Me põhjendame oma analüüsi ning
valideerime saadud tulemusi mitmel illustratiivsel näitel. Me loodame, et saadud tulemused
aitavad arendajatel paremini aru saada, kuidas turvariske süsteemi disainietapil arvesse võtta.
Peale selle, nende keelte analüüs ühisel kontseptuaalsel taustal annab tulevikus võimaluse
neid keeli korraga kasutada ning loodud mudeleid ühest keelest teise teisendada.
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Appendix
A.1 Online Banking
ABC Bank (fictitious) is a renowned bank which has online facilities11 for its customers.  The
objectives of online facilities are to improve the quality of service and better deal with the
client. The main features of the online banking are transactional, non-transactional, financial
administration and transaction approval process. Transition includes deposit and withdraw
from the account and payments to third parties, including bill payment and money transfer to
other parties. It also includes fund transfer between client’s own saving account and
transactional account and deposit money for interest.  Non transactional functions includes
download bank statement and viewing transactions. Online banking system is a server client
based system. The main application is hosted in the server and the client access the banking
service through any standard web browser (e.g., Mozilla Firefox, Opera). The server includes
both database server (e.g., Oracle) and web server (e.g., Apache). The authentication is done
using SSL secure connection.
There are few attacks possible against online banking. Among them phishing and pharming
are the most popular in hackers community. Cross-site scripting and keylogger/Trojan horses
can also be used to steal login information. New attacks are always evolving and getting more
and more serious and complex.  For example,  man in the browser attack, where a Trojan
horse permits a remote attacker to modify the client’s account number and also the amount in
a transaction.
Security experts use several countermeasures to combat against these attacks. Digital
certificate is used to stop phishing and pharming. To protect their system from Trojan horses
and viruses  users/clients should use updated antivirus and anti malware. Users also should be
careful when they provide their credentials online. To protect against Man in the Browser
attack, user should always use standard browser with latest security patches.
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_banking
